The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union

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The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union

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Pierre Salmon ()

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Pierre Salmon

Abstract

A major characteristic of the European Union is its transitional or evolving nature, in particular with regard to the assignment of powers between the two main levels of government. More precisely, under current constitutional arrangements, this evolving nature takes the form of an integration process which tends to be monotonous, that is, which can only with great difficulty be reversed. The paper is mainly devoted to the explanation of how this comes about and what effects this has on other features of the process. As a concluding remark, however, it suggests that an additional criterion for judging -- or an additional indicator for reading -- proposed constitutional reforms can be derived from the analysis. This criterion or indicator should be of some value independently of the position adopted with regard to European integration.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 993.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_993

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-05-02 (All new papers)

Cited by:
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Luisa Giuriato, 2006. "The decision-making procedures for the European Union's finances in the Constitutional debate," Working Papers 96, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
Elisabetta Croci Angelini, 2007. "Resisting Globalization: Voting Power Indices and the National Interest in the EU Decision-making," Working Papers 08-2007, Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE), revised Feb 2009.

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