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Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Albert Banal-Estanol ()
Ines Macho-Stadler ()
Jo Seldeslachts ()
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We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to more e.ciency and may even lead to efficiency losses. These mergers lead to lower total welfare, suggesting that a regulator should be careful in assuming that possible efficiency gains of a merger will be effectively realised. Moreover, the paper offers a possible explanation for merger failures.
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Paper provided by CESifo GmbH in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 944.
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Date of creation: 2003Date of revision:
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Keywords: horizontal mergers investment efficiency gains internal conflict Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Miguel González-Maestre & Diego Peñarrubia, 2005.
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