This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Effrosyni Diamantoudi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 22 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (09)
Pages: 431-446
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:431-446

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm

Order Information:
Web: http://link.springer.de/orders.htm

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Keywords and Phrases:Coalition structures; Binding agreements; Stability.; JEL Classification Numbers:C70; C71.;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jamsheed Shorish, . "Quasi-Static Macroeconomic Systems," Economics Working Papers 2000-3, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Xue, Licun, 2002. "Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 165-176, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Peter Skott, . "Demand Policy in the Long Run," Economics Working Papers 2000-17, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  5. Niels Haldrup & Peter Lildholdt, 2005. "Local power functions of tests for double unit roots," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 59(2), pages 159-179. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-27, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Boriss Siliverstovs, 2005. "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition Autoregressive model," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Jakob Roland Munch & Michael Svarer, . "Mortality and Socio-economic Differences in a Competing Risks Model," Economics Working Papers 2001-1, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  10. Paul Auerbach & Peter Skott, . "Skill Asymmetries, Increasing Wage Inequality and Unemployment," Economics Working Papers 2000-18, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Graham Elliott & Michael Jansson, . "Testing for Unit Roots with Stationary Covariates," Economics Working Papers 2000-6, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Rosholm, Michael & Svarer, Michael, 2001. "Structurally dependent competing risks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 169-173, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Licun Xue, . "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  17. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Albert Banal-Estaño & Inés Macho-Stadler & Jo Seldeslachts, 2004. "Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc also has a blog.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.