IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v22y2003i2p431-446.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Author

Listed:
  • Effrosyni Diamantoudi

Abstract

This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Suggested Citation

  • Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:431-446
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-002-0301-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xue, Licun, 2002. "Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 165-176, March.
    2. Niels Haldrup & Peter Lildholdt, 2005. "Local power functions of tests for double unit roots," Statistica Neerlandica, Netherlands Society for Statistics and Operations Research, vol. 59(2), pages 159-179, May.
    3. Rosholm, Michael & Svarer, Michael, 2001. "Structurally dependent competing risks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 169-173, November.
    4. Boriss Siliverstovs, 2005. "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition Autoregressive model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11.
    5. Elliott, Graham & Jansson, Michael, 2003. "Testing for unit roots with stationary covariates," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 75-89, July.
    6. Torben M. Andersen, "undated". "Nominal Rigidities and the Optimal Rate of Inflation," Economics Working Papers 2000-19, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, September.
    8. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Licun Xue, 2003. "Farsighted stability in hedonic games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 21(1), pages 39-61, August.
    9. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers 98-1, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 1998.
    10. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
    11. Barnett,William A. & Moulin,Hervé & Salles,Maurice & Schofield,Norman J. (ed.), 1995. "Social Choice, Welfare, and Ethics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521443401.
    12. Peter Skott, "undated". "Demand Policy in the Long Run," Economics Working Papers 2000-17, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    13. Donsimoni, Marie-Paule & Economides, Nicholas S & Polemarchakis, Herakles M, 1986. "Stable Cartels," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 317-327, June.
    14. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, "undated". "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    15. Niels Haldrup & Peter Lildholdt, 2002. "On the Robustness of Unit Root Tests in the Presence of Double Unit Roots," Journal of Time Series Analysis, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 155-171, March.
    16. Paul Auerbach & Peter Skott, "undated". "Skill Asymmetries, Increasing Wage Inequality and Unemployment," Economics Working Papers 2000-18, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    17. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
    18. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1997. "Equilibrium Binding Agreements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 30-78, March.
    19. Jamsheed Shorish, "undated". "Quasi-Static Macroeconomic Systems," Economics Working Papers 2000-3, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    20. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(3), pages 603-627.
    21. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    22. Licun Xue, "undated". "A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability," Economics Working Papers 2000-4, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    23. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Social choice," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 31, pages 1091-1125, Elsevier.
    24. Jakob Roland Munch & Michael Svarer, "undated". "Mortality and Socio-economic Differences in a Competing Risks Model," Economics Working Papers 2001-1, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, September.
    2. Albert Banal & Ines Macho-Stadler & Jo Seldeslachts, 2003. "Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 569.03, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    4. Haeringer, Guillaume, 2004. "Equilibrium binding agreements: a comment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 140-143, July.
    5. repec:smu:ecowpa:1403 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Roland Pongou & Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Bertrand Tchantcho, 2008. "Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 555-574, June.
    7. Sheng-Chieh Huang & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(2), pages 309-329, February.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Boriss Siliverstovs, 2005. "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition Autoregressive model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11.
    2. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, "undated". "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    3. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, "undated". "Investment under Uncertainty - the Case of Repeated Investment Options," Economics Working Papers 2000-15, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    4. Vartiainen, Hannu, 2011. "Dynamic coalitional equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 672-698, March.
    5. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, March.
    6. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Diamantoudi, Effrosyni & Xue, Licun, 2007. "Coalitions, agreements and efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 105-125, September.
    8. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, "undated". "A Dynamic Agricultural Household Model with Uncertain Income and Irreversible and Indivisible Investments under Credit Constraints," Economics Working Papers 2000-7, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    9. Forges, Françoise & Orzach, Ram, 2011. "Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 760-767.
    10. Luo, Xiao & Yang, Chih-Chun, 2009. "Bayesian coalitional rationalizability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 248-263, January.
    11. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios Sartzetakis, 2015. "International environmental agreements: coordinated action under foresight," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 59(3), pages 527-546, August.
    12. Thoron, Sylvie, 2004. "Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 111-134, January.
    13. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
    14. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2018. "International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 241-257, September.
    15. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of Coalitional Rationality," Scholarly Articles 3204917, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    16. Ambrus, Attila, 2009. "Theories of coalitional rationality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 676-695, March.
    17. Dutta, Rohan & Levine, David Knudsen & Modica, Salvatore, 2018. "Collusion constrained equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    18. Ambrus, Attila, 2006. "Coalitional Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3200266, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    19. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
    20. repec:dau:papers:123456789/7891 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke, 2003. "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 185-203, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Keywords and Phrases:Coalition structures; Binding agreements; Stability.; JEL Classification Numbers:C70; C71.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:22:y:2003:i:2:p:431-446. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.