Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Licun Xue

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

Abstract

This paper studies infinitely repeated games where players can form coalitions to coordinate their actions via self-enforcing agreements. The proposed notion of "stable agreements" extends a characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium paths by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition can deviate in such a way that by solely coordinating the actions of its own members, it guarantees a higher payoff for each member. Existence of the proposed notion is established and its relation to other notions is investigated.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.au.dk/afn/wp/00/wp00_13.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2000-13.

as in new window
Length: 18
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-13

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

Related research

Keywords: Repeated games; renegotiation; self-enforcing agreements; coalitions;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  2. MacLeod, B.W. & Bergin, J., 1991. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Cahiers de recherche 9118, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
  4. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Extending Renegotiation-Proofness To Infinite Horizon Games," Papers 16-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations," Papers 04-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  7. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 278-293, December.
  8. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
  9. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  10. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, . "Investment under Uncertainty - the Case of Repeated Investment Options," Economics Working Papers 2000-15, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, 09.
  3. Boriss Siliverstovs, . "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition AutoRegressive model," Economics Working Papers 2000-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  4. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, . "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  5. Xiao Luo, 2009. "On the foundation of stability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 185-201, August.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-13. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.