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Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games

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Author Info
Licun Xue () (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

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Abstract

This paper studies infinitely repeated games where players can form coalitions to coordinate their actions via self-enforcing agreements. The proposed notion of "stable agreements" extends a characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium paths by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition can deviate in such a way that by solely coordinating the actions of its own members, it guarantees a higher payoff for each member. Existence of the proposed notion is established and its relation to other notions is investigated.

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Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2000-13.

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Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-13

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Related research
Keywords: Repeated games; renegotiation; self-enforcing agreements; coalitions;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Bergin James & MacLeod W. Bentley, 1993. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 42-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations," Papers 04-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Greenberg, Joseph, 1989. "An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 278-293, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Asheim, Geir B., 1991. "Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, . "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  2. Xiao Luo, 2009. "On the foundation of stability," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 185-201, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Boriss Siliverstovs, . "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition AutoRegressive model," Economics Working Papers 2000-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, . "Investment under Uncertainty - the Case of Repeated Investment Options," Economics Working Papers 2000-15, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
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