Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games

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Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games

Author Info

James Bergin
Bentley MacLeod

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Abstract

This paper introduces a general framework for the discussion of renegotiation in repeated games, provides a new concept of "renegotiation proof" equilibrium, and shows how this model clarifies and unifies existing work in this area. The procedure involves restricting axiomatically the class of agreements which may be considered admissible, thus taking incentives into consideration at the beginning of the game when an agreement is selected. We define a preference ordering on agreements, so that given the set of agreements which satisfy the axioms imposed, we may select a "best" agreement. We use this framework to introduce a new concept of renegotiation proofness -- recursive efficiency -- and apply it to the efficiency wage model.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Queen's University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 752.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:752

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Article
- Bergin James & MacLeod W. Bentley, 1993. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 42-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- MacLeod, B.W. & Bergin, J., 1991. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Cahiers de recherche 9118, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- MacLeod, B.W. & Bergin, J., 1991. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Cahiers de recherche 9118, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Bergin, J. & Macleod, B., 1989. "Eficiency And Renegotiation In Repeated Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 121-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Cheng Wang, 2000. "Renegotiation-Proof Dynamic Contracts with Private Information," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(3), pages 396-422, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1225, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 1999. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 99-09, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Blonski, Matthias & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2002. "Relational Contracts and Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers 3460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Erik Ansink, 2009. "Self-enforcing Agreements on Water allocation," Working Papers 2009.73, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, 2000. "Conditioning Institutions and Renegotiation," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 1999-09, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts," Discussion Papers 0506-23, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 1978, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Anthony Fai-Tong Chung, 2004. "Coalition-Stable Equilibria in Repeated Games," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 581, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Asheim, Geir B, 1997. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(3), pages 427-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Licun Xue, . "Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 2000-13, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Xue, Licun, 2002. "Stable agreements in infinitely repeated games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 165-176, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Timothy L. Sorenson, 2007. "Credible collusion in multimarket oligopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(2), pages 115-128. [Downloadable!]

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