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Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts

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Author Info

  • ASHEIM, G.B.
  • STRAND, J.

Abstract

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 08/1989.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1989_008

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Related research

Keywords: enterprises ; risk ; trade unions ; contracts;

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References

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  1. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
  2. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
  3. Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Extending Renegotiation-Proofness To Infinite Horizon Games," Papers 16-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  5. Rosen, Sherwin, 1985. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 1144-75, September.
  6. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-85, July.
  7. Oswald, Andrew J, 1982. "The Microeconomic Theory of the Trade Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(367), pages 576-95, September.
  8. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
  9. Thomas, Jonathan & Worrall, Tim, 1988. "Self-enforcing Wage Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 541-54, October.
  10. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  11. Hoel, Michael & Moene, Karl O, 1988. " Profit Sharing, Unions and Investments," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 90(4), pages 493-505.
  12. Asheim, G.B. & Strand, J., 1989. "Long-Term Union-Firm Contracts," Papers 10-89, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  13. Azariadis, Costas, 1975. "Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(6), pages 1183-1202, December.
  14. Malcomson, James M, 1983. "Trade Unions and Economic Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369a), pages 51-65, Supplemen.
  15. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
  16. Horn, Henrik & Svensson, Lars E O, 1986. "Trade Unions and Optimal Labour Contracts," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 96(382), pages 323-41, June.
  17. Paz Espinosa, Maria & Rhee, Changyong, 1989. "Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 565-88, August.
  18. David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Thomas, J. & Worrall, T., 1990. "Foreign Direct Investment And The Risk Of Expropriation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 342, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  2. Geir Asheim & Jon Strand, 1991. "Long-term union-firm contracts," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 161-184, June.
  3. GOBERT, Karine & POITEVIN, Michel, 1998. "Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 9806, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  4. Gauthier, Celine & Poitevin, Michel & Gonzalez, Patrick, 1997. "Ex Ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 106-144, September.

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