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Individual and Collective Time-Consistency

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Author Info
Asheim, G.B.

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders the Strotz-Pollak problem of consistent planning and argues that a solution to this problem requires a refinement of subgame-perfectness. Such refinement is offred through an analysis based on Greenberg's "theory of social situations". A unifying framework is presented whereby consistent one-person planning as a problem of individual time-consistency and renegotiation-proofness as a problem of colective time-consistency are captured through the same general concept.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 20/1996.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1996_020

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Related research
Keywords: GAME THEORY; OPTIMISTIC STABILITY;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
  2. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations," Papers 04-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  4. Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1987. "On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 55-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  6. Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Nalebuff, B. & Shubik, M., 1988. "Revenge And Rational Play," Papers 138, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  10. Asheim, Geir B., 1991. "Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  13. Bergin James & MacLeod W. Bentley, 1993. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 42-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(1), pages 159-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Goldman, Steven M, 1980. "Consistent Plans," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 533-37, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Asheim, Geir B, 1988. "Rawlsian Intergenerational Justice as a Markov-Perfect Equilibrium in a Resource Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(3), pages 469-83, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Peleg, Bezalel & Yaari, Menahem E, 1973. "On the Existence of a Consistent Course of Action when Tastes are Changing," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(3), pages 391-401, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bennett, E. & Van Damme, E., 1990. "Demand Commitment Bargaining: -The Case Of Apex Games," Papers 9062, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  20. Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell., 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 90-136, University of California at Berkeley.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Brasao, Ana, 2000. "Management of Southern Atlantic bluefin tuna: the time consistency of the cooperative management solution," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp377, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  2. Christopher J. Tyson, 2006. "Management of a Capital Stock by Strotz's Naive Planner," Economics Papers 2006-W01, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford. [Downloadable!]
  3. Geir Asheim & Bjart Holtsmark, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Climate Agreements with Full Participation: Conditions for Pareto-Efficiency," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(4), pages 519-533, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Asheim, Geir B., 2007. "Procrastination, partial naivete, and behavioral welfare analysis," Memorandum 02/2007, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. M. Dolores Collado & Lilia Maliar & Serguei Maliar, 2003. "Quasi-Geometric Consumers: Panel Data Evidence," Working Papers. Serie AD 2003-09, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  6. VIEILLE, Nicolas & WEIBULL, Jörgen W., 2002. "Uniqueness in infinitely repeated decision problems," Les Cahiers de Recherche 755, HEC Paris.
    Other versions:
  7. Roger Lagunoff, 2002. "Credible Communication in Dynastic Government," Wallis Working Papers WP34, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Paul Frijters & Alexander F. Tieman, 1999. "The Role and Evolution of Central Authorities," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-053/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Krusell, Per & Smith Jr., Anthony A, 2001. "Consumption-Savings Decisions with Quasi-Geometric Discounting," CEPR Discussion Papers 2651, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Emre Ozdenoren, 1999. "Subjective Representation of Complexity," Discussion Papers 1249, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  11. Edward C. Prescott & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 2000. "On the equilibrium concept for overlapping generations organizations," Staff Report 282, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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