On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 43 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Asheim, G., 1991.
"Individual and Collective Time Consistency,"
1991-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Federico Echenique, 2000.
"Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities,"
Game Theory and Information
- Echenique, Federico, 2004. "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 348-364, February.
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1300, Department of Economics - dECON.
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7553, David K. Levine.
- Carmona, Guilherme, 2006. "Two Simple Proofs of a Theorem by Harris," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp486, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
- AMIR, Rabah, 2001. "Stochastic games in economics and related fields: an overview," CORE Discussion Papers 2001060, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Karl Iorio & Alejandro M. Manuelli, 1990. "Sequential Equilibria and Cheap Talk in Infinite Signaling Games," Discussion Papers 915, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Amir, Rabah & Grilo, Isabel, 1999. "Stackelberg versus Cournot Equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.