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• Rabah Amir

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-21
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:1:p:1-21

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