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Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

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  • Echenique, Federico

Abstract

(less than 25 lines) I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-empty, complete lattice. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. The correspondence has a natural interpretation. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out---surprisingly---to be a very restrictive class of games.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 46 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 348-364

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:348-364

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  10. Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Xavier Vives, 2009. "Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 151-171, July.
  2. Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.
  3. Lambertini, Luca & Mantovani, Andrea, 2006. "Identifying reaction functions in differential oligopoly games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 252-271, December.
  4. Mathevet, Laurent & Steiner, Jakub, 2013. "Tractable dynamic global games and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2583-2619.
  5. Jakub Steiner & Laurent Mathevet, 2012. "Sand in the Wheels: A Dynamic Global-Game Approach," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 123, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5583, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Balbus, Łukasz & Reffett, Kevin & Woźny, Łukasz, 2014. "A constructive study of Markov equilibria in stochastic games with strategic complementarities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 815-840.

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