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Commitment games

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Author Info

  • Renou, Ludovic

Abstract

This paper explores how the ability to commit in games affect equilibrium payoffs. More precisely, we consider two-stage games, called commitment games, in which players can commit to some of their strategies in the first stage, and play the game induced by their commitment in the second stage. We completely characterize equilibrium payoffs of commitment games. Among others, we show that the power to commit in finitely repeated games as, for instance, finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games, can lead to efficiency even though the constituent game does not satisfy the assumptions of Benoît and Krishna [1987. Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games. Int. J. Game Theory 16, 197-204].

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 66 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 488-505

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:1:p:488-505

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

Related research

Keywords: Commitment Efficiency Self-enforcing agreement Repeated games;

References

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  1. McKelvey, Richard D. & McLennan, Andrew, 1996. "Computation of equilibria in finite games," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: H. M. Amman & D. A. Kendrick & J. Rust (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 87-142 Elsevier.
  2. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
  3. Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio, 2006. "Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 100-111, April.
  4. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  5. Van Damme, E. & Hurkens, S., 1993. "Commitment Robust Equilibria and Endogenous Timing," Papers 9356, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  6. Hamilton, J.H. & Slutsky, S.M., 1988. "Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria," Papers 88-4, Florida - College of Business Administration.
  7. Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities," Game Theory and Information 0004005, EconWPA.
  8. John Geanakoplos & Chien-fu Chou, 1988. "The Power of Commitment," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 885, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  10. Gilboa, Itzhak & Zemel, Eitan, 1989. "Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 80-93, March.
  11. Adam Tauman Kalai & Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet, 2007. "Voluntary Commitments Lead to Efficiency," Discussion Papers 1444, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2010. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," PSE Working Papers halshs-00564890, HAL.
  2. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," School of Economics Working Papers 2006-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
  3. Ignacio García-Jurado & Natividad Llorca & Ana Meca & Manuel Pulido & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2009. "Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 85-95, July.
  4. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00564890 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Arina Nikandrova, 2013. "Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(3), pages 339-346, July.
  6. Heller, Yuval & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Rule Rationality," MPRA Paper 48746, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. James W. Bono & David H. Wolpert, 2009. "Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game," Working Papers 2009-10, American University, Department of Economics.
  8. Rohan Dutta & Ryosuke Ishii, 2013. "Coordinating by Not Committing : Efficiency as the Unique Outcome," Cahiers de recherche 10-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  9. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.

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