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Endougenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly

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  • Rabah Amir

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Arizona)

  • Giuseppe De Feo

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University of Pavia)

Abstract

This paper applies the framework of endogenous timing in games to mixed quantity duopoly, wherein a private – domestic or foreign – firm competes with a public, welfare maximizing firm. We show that simultaneous play never emerges as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the extended game, in sharp contrast to private duopoly games. We provide sufficient conditions for the emergence of public and/or private leadership equilibrium. In all cases, private profits and social welfare are higher than under the corresponding Cournot equilibrium. From a methodological viewpoint we make extensive use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games in order to avoid common extraneous assumptions such as concavity, existence and uniqueness of the different equilibria, whenever possible. Some policy implications are drawn, in particular those relating to the merits of privatization.

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File URL: http://economia.unipv.it/docs/dipeco/quad/ps/RePEc/pav/wpaper/q162.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Pavia, Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods in its series Quaderni di Dipartimento with number 162.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pav:wpaper:162

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Keywords: Mixed markets; endogenous timing; Cournot equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; privatization.;

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  1. von Stengel, Bernhard, 2010. "Follower payoffs in symmetric duopoly games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 512-516, July.
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