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Wage-rise contract and endogenous timing in international mixed duopoly

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  • Ohnishi, Kazuhiro
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    Abstract

    This paper examines an endogenous-timing mixed model, where a public firm competes against a foreign private firm. Each firm first chooses the timing for adopting a wage-rise contract as a strategic instrument. The following situation is considered. In the first stage, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses the stage in which it adopts a wage-rise contract, namely either stage 2 or stage 3. In the second stage, the firm choosing stage 2 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. In the third stage, the firm choosing stage 3 can adopt the wage-rise contract in this stage. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its output. The paper discusses the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed model.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

    Volume (Year): 64 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 121-127

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:64:y:2010:i:2:p:121-127

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

    Related research

    Keywords: Wage-rise contract Endogenous timing International mixed duopoly Domestic public firm Foreign private firm;

    References

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    1. Pal, Debashis, 1998. "Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 181-185, November.
    2. CREMER, Helmuth & MARCHAND, Maurice & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers RP -832, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    7. Amir Rabah, 1995. "Endogenous Timing in Two-Player Games: A Counterexample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 234-237, May.
    8. Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz & María Begoña Garzón, 2003. "Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 80(1), pages 27-42, 08.
    9. Kenneth Fjell & Debashis Pal, 1996. "A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 737-43, August.
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    12. White, Mark D., 1996. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 189-195, November.
    13. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07.
    14. Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S, 2002. "Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 267-81, September.
    15. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
    16. Roger Ware, 1986. "A Model of Public Enterprise with Entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(4), pages 642-55, November.
    17. Debashis Pal & Mark D. White, 1998. "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 264-281, October.
    18. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2003. "A Model of a Price-setting Duopoly with a Wage-rise Contract," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 149-157, 06.
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