Mixed Duopoly, Privatization And Subsidization In An Endogenous Timing Framework
AbstractThis is the first paper to consider the endogenous timing in mixed duopoly with subsidization. Pal (Economics Letters, Vol. 61 (1998), pp. 181-185) shows that private leadership is always an equilibrium outcome in a mixed duopoly without any subsidy. By including the production subsidy, we observe that private leadership may disappear from equilibrium and that Cournot and public leadership become the likely equilibrium outcomes. Furthermore, we find that when firms have identical technologies the first-best allocation can be attained by the same subsidy before and after privatization even though firms' production timings are endogenized. Finally, we examine privatization with lobbying activities and show that such privatization leads to the deterioration of social welfare. Copyright � 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation � 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Manchester in its journal The Manchester School.
Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manchester M13 9PL
Phone: (0)161 275 4868
Fax: (0)161 275 4812
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1463-6786
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Scrimitore, Marcella, 2013. "Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 337-341.
- Toshihiro Matsumura & Akira Ogawa, 2009. "Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 265-272, July.
- Matsumura, Toshihiro & Okumura, Yasunori, 2013. "Privatization neutrality theorem revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 324-326.
- Wang F.S., Leonard & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2011. "Privatization, Efficiency Gap, and Subsidization with Excess Taxation Burden," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 52(1), pages 55-68, June.
- Daisuke Hirata & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2011. "Price leadership in a homogeneous product market," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 199-217, November.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.