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Mixed Duopoly with Price Competition

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  • Roy Chowdhury, Prabal

Abstract

This paper examines coalition-proof Nash equilibria (CPNE) of a mixed duopoly with price competition where the public firm meets all the demand coming to it. If the private firm is free to supply less than demand, then the unique CPNE involves the competitive price. If however the private firm also has to supply all its demand, then the set of CPNE prices turns out to be an interval, with prices ranging from the socially optimal one, to the price under complete privatization.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9220/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 9220.

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Date of creation: Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:9220

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Keywords: Mixed duopoly; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; price competition;

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References

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  1. Fjell, Kenneth & Heywood, John S, 2002. "Public Stackelberg Leadership in a Mixed Oligopoly with Foreign Firms," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 267-81, September.
  2. CREMER, Helmuth & MARCHAND, Maurice & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -930, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Anderson, S.P. & de Palma, A. & Thisse, J.F., 1995. "Privatization and Efficiency in a Differentiated Industry," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 9505, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  4. Joanna Poyago-Theotoky, 2001. "Mixed oligopoly, subsidization and the order of firms' moves: an irrelevance result," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-5.
  5. Debashis Pal & Mark D. White, 1998. "Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 264-281, October.
  6. Kato, Kazuhiko & Tomaru, Yoshihiro, 2007. "Mixed oligopoly, privatization, subsidization, and the order of firms' moves: Several types of objectives," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 287-292, August.
  7. Toshihiro Matsumura, 2003. "Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 275-287, 07.
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  14. Cremer, H. & Marchand, M. & Thisse, J.-F., 1987. "The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987010, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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  17. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
  18. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1989. "Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 302-11, April.
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  20. Arghya Ghosh & Manipushpak Mitra, 2008. "Comparing Bertrand and Cournot Outcomes in the Presence of Public Firms," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales 2008-18, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  21. Toshihiro Matsumura & Osamu Kanda, 2005. "Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 84(1), pages 27-48, 02.
  22. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria II. Applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 13-29, June.
  23. Yoshihiro Tomaru, 2006. "Mixed Oligopoly, Partial Privatization and Subsidization," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(5), pages 1-6.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rupayan Pal, 2010. "How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2010-015, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  2. Balogh, Tamás L. & Tasnádi, Attila, 2011. "Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?," MPRA Paper 30993, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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