Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics

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Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics

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Aaron S. Edlin and Chris Shannon.

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Abstract

This note provides sufficient conditions to draw strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems. These results extend the lattice-theoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from first- order conditions. We illustrate the importance of these results through examples involving holdup problems and optimal tax problems.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Economics Working Papers with number 95-238.

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Date of creation: 01 Jul 1995
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbwp:95-238

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Article
- Edlin, Aaron S. & Shannon, Chris, 1998. "Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 201-219, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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