Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities

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Extensive Form Games and Strategic Complementarities

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Federico Echenique

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Federico Echenique

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 7553.

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Date of creation: 30 Sep 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:7553

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Article
- Echenique, Federico, 2004. "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 348-364, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities," Game Theory and Information 0004005, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Federico Echenique, 2000. "Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities," Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) 1300, Department of Economics - dECON. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2000-10-05 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2001-02-08 (Game Theory)
NEP-IND-2000-10-05 (Industrial Organization)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Zhou Lin, 1994. "The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game Is a Complete Lattice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 295-300, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401.
Other versions:
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
Hellwig, Martin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1987. "On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 55-75, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Vives, X., 1988. "Nash Equilibrium With Strategic Complementarities," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 107-88, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe., 1987. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Economics Working Papers 8746, University of California at Berkeley.
Other versions:
- Simon, Leo K & Stinchcombe, Maxwell B, 1989. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 1171-1214, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Harris, Christopher & Reny, Philip & Robson, Arthur, 1995. "The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 507-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games," IESE Research Papers D/619, IESE Business School.
Other versions:
- Xavier Vives, 2009. "Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 151-171, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Strategic Complementarities in Multi-Stage Games," CEPR Discussion Papers 5583, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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