One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt58n9q9vz.
Date of creation: 01 Feb 1990
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communication; renegotiation; repeated games; Stackelberg equilibrium; Social and Behavioral Sciences;
Other versions of this item:
- Dekel, Eddie & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 299-303, December.
- Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell., 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 90-136, University of California at Berkeley.
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