One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 2 (1990)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Dekel, Eddie & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt58n9q9vz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell., 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 90-136, University of California at Berkeley.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marco Celentani & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1992.
"Reputation in Dynamic Games,"
1009, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Celentani, Marco & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "Reputation in dynamic games," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4816, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Asheim, G., 1991.
"Individual and Collective Time Consistency,"
1991-69, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.