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Joseph Farrell

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This is information that was supplied by Joseph Farrell in registering through RePEc. If you are Joseph Farrell , you may change this information at the RePEc Author Service. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at the RePEc Author Service. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

Personal Details

First Name: Joseph
Middle Name:
Last Name: Farrell
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pfa35

Email:
Homepage: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/users/farrell
Postal Address: Dept of Economics #3880 University of California Berkeley CA 94720-3880 USA
Phone:

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of California-Berkeley
Location: Berkeley, California (United States)
Homepage: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/econ/
Email:
Phone: 510-642-0822
Fax: 510-642-6615
Postal: 549 Evans Hall # 3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
Handle: RePEc:edi:debrkus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

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Working papers

  1. Aaron Edlin & Joseph Farrell, 2011. "Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process," NBER Working Papers 16818, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Shapiro, Carl & Farrell, Joseph, 2008. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt35c5f846, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  3. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Improving Critical Loss Analysis," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt0ff249px, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  4. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt8vg425vj, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt1tw2d426, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  6. Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, 2006. "Co-ordination and Lock-in: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects," Economics Papers 2006-W07, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  7. Joseph Farrell, 2005. "Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing," Industrial Organization 0504017, EconWPA.
  8. Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, 2004. "The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation Policy," Law and Economics 0401003, EconWPA.
  9. Joseph Farrell, 2004. "Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network," Industrial Organization 0401002, EconWPA.
  10. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 2004. "Intellectual Property, Competition, and Information Technology," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt3s03932b, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  11. Joseph Farrell, 2004. "Negotiation and Merger Remedies: Some Problems," Industrial Organization 0401004, EconWPA.
  12. Joseph Farrell & Richard J. Gilbert & Michael L. Katz, 2003. "Market Structure, Organizational Structure, and R&D Diversity," Industrial Organization 0303006, EconWPA.
  13. Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, 2003. "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation In The Internet Age," Industrial Organization 0303007, EconWPA.
  14. Farrell, Joseph & Weiser, Philip J., 2002. "Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Age of the Internet," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9cw8940r, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  15. Edlin, Aaron S. & Farrell, Joseph, 2002. "The American Airline Case: A Chance to Clairfy," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt3q1998fh, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  16. Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz., 2001. "Competition or Predation? Schumpeterian Rivalry in Network Markets," Economics Working Papers E01-306, University of California at Berkeley.
  17. Joseph Farrell and Michael L. Katz., 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Economics Working Papers E00-286, University of California at Berkeley.
  18. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 2000. "Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Economics Working Papers E00-291, University of California at Berkeley.
  19. Severin Borenstein & Joseph Farrell, 1999. "Do Investors Forecast Fat Firms? Evidence from the Gold Mining Industry," NBER Working Papers 7075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Eddie Dekel and Joseph Farrell., 1990. "One-Sided Patience with One-Sided Communication Does Not Justify Stackelberg Equilibrium," Economics Working Papers 90-136, University of California at Berkeley.
  21. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1989. "Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces," Economics Working Papers 89-130, University of California at Berkeley.
  22. Farrell, J. & Gibbons, R., 1989. "Cheap Talk With Two Audiences," Working papers 518, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  23. Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
  24. Robert Gibbons & Joseph Farrell, 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Working papers 482, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  25. Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences: A Taxonomy," Economics Working Papers 8890, University of California at Berkeley.
  26. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs," Economics Working Papers 8865, University of California at Berkeley.
  27. Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, 1988. "Cheap Talk, Neologisms, and Bargaining," Working papers 500, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  28. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
  29. Joseph Farrell., 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem," Economics Working Papers 8747, University of California at Berkeley.
  30. Joseph Farrell., 1987. "Competition with Lock-In," Economics Working Papers 8722, University of California at Berkeley.
  31. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1987. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," Economics Working Papers 8758, University of California at Berkeley.
  32. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1987. "Dynamic Competition with Lock-In," Economics Working Papers 8727, University of California at Berkeley.
  33. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1987. "Coordination Through Committees and Markets," Economics Working Papers 8740, University of California at Berkeley.
  34. Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Communication between Potential Entrants," Economics Working Papers 8615, University of California at Berkeley.
  35. Joseph Farrell., 1986. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Economics Working Papers 8609, University of California at Berkeley.
  36. Joseph Farrell & Bob Gibbons, 1986. "Cheap Talk in Bargaining Games," Working papers 422, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  37. Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer., 1986. "Partnerships," Economics Working Papers 8616, University of California at Berkeley.
  38. Joseph Farrell and Nancy T. Gallini., 1986. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," Economics Working Papers 8618, University of California at Berkeley.
  39. Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner., 1986. "Competition, Compatibility and Standards: The Economics of Horses, Penguins and Lemmings," Economics Working Papers 8610, University of California at Berkeley.
  40. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier," Working papers 387, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  41. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  42. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Allocating and Abrogating Rights: How Should Conflicts be Resolved Under Incomplete Information," Working papers 381, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  43. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "How Effective is Potential Competition?," Working papers 375, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  44. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Communication Equilibrium in Games," Working papers 382, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  45. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, and Comments on Its Importance," Working papers 374, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  46. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Owner-Consumers and Efficiency," Working papers 380, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  47. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Economic Issues in Standardization," Working papers 393, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  48. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Installed Base and Compatibility With Implications for Product Preannouncements," Working papers 385, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  49. Joseph Farrell, 1984. "Moral Hazard....," Working papers 344, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  50. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  51. J. Farrell, 1983. "Communication in Game I: Mechanism Design without a Mediator," Working papers 334, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    RePEc:hoo:wpaper:e-89-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:hoo:wpaper:e-89-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    RePEc:hoo:wpaper:e-88-45 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Joseph Farrell & David Balan & Keith Brand & Brett Wendling, 2011. "Economics at the FTC: Hospital Mergers, Authorized Generic Drugs, and Consumer Credit Markets," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 39(4), pages 271-296, December.
  2. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2011. "Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss Analysis: Response," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
  3. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
  4. Joseph Farrell & Janis Pappalardo & Howard Shelanski, 2010. "Economics at the FTC: Mergers, Dominant-Firm Conduct, and Consumer Behavior," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 37(4), pages 263-277, December.
  5. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Upward Pricing Pressure in Horizontal Merger Analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-9, September.
  6. Joseph Farrell & Paul Pautler & Michael Vita, 2009. "Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 369-385, December.
  7. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2008. "How Strong Are Weak Patents?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1347-69, September.
  8. Farrell Joseph, 2006. "Efficiency and Competition between Payment Instruments," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-19, March.
  9. Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
  10. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, 2005. "Competition Or Predation? Consumer Coordination, Strategic Pricing And Price Floors In Network Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 203-231, 06.
  11. Farrell Joseph, 2005. "Assessing Australian Interchange Regulation: Comments on Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(4), pages 1-5, December.
  12. Joseph Farrell, 2003. "Integration and Independent Innovation on a Network," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 420-424, May.
  13. Farrell, Joseph & Katz, Michael L, 2000. "Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in Systems Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 413-32, December.
  14. Joseph Farrell & Severin Borenstein, 2000. "Is Cost-Cutting Evidence of X-Inefficiency?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 224-227, May.
  15. Farrell, Joseph, 2000. "The Professor and the Madmen: Review of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages 842-45, November.
  16. Joseph Farrell & Hunter K. Monroe & Garth Saloner, 1998. "The Vertical Organization of Industry: Systems Competition versus Component Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 143-182, 06.
  17. Farrell, Joseph, 1997. "Prospects for Deregulation in Telecommunications," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(4), pages 719-40, December.
  18. Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, 1996. "Cheap Talk," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 103-118, Summer.
  19. Farrell, Joseph, 1995. "Talk Is Cheap," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 186-90, May.
  20. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1995. "Cheap Talk about Specific Investments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(2), pages 313-34, October.
  21. Farrell, Joseph & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1994. "Irrational behavior in the AT&T investment game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 471-474, August.
  22. Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(2), pages 117-131, Spring.
  23. Farrell Joseph, 1993. "Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 514-531, October.
  24. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1992. "Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(1), pages 9-35, March.
  25. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1991. "Horizontal Mergers: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(4), pages 1007-11, September.
  26. Besen, Stanley M. & Farrell, Joseph, 1991. "The role of the ITU in standardization : Pre-eminence, impotence or rubber stamp?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 311-321, August.
  27. Dekel, Eddie & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify stackelberg equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 299-303, December.
  28. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Asset Ownership and Market Structure in Oligopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(2), pages 275-292, Summer.
  29. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March.
  30. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-26, August.
  31. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 376-378, December.
  32. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap Talk with Two Audiences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1214-23, December.
  33. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
  34. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June.
  35. Farrell, Joseph & Lander, Eric, 1989. "Competition between and within teams : The Lifeboat Principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 205-208.
  36. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 51-68, March.
  37. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
  38. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1988. "Coordination through Committees and Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 235-252, Summer.
  39. Farrell, Joseph & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1988. "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 279-97, May.
  40. Farrell, Joseph & Gallini, Nancy T, 1988. "Second-Sourcing as a Commitment: Monopoly Incentives to Attract Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 673-94, November.
  41. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Puzzles: Sylvia, Ice Cream and More," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 175-82, Summer.
  42. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 1988. "Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 123-137, Spring.
  43. Farrell, Joseph, 1987. "Information and the Coase Theorem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 113-29, Fall.
  44. Farrell, Joseph, 1987. "Rigidity vs. License," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 195-97, March.
  45. Joseph Farrell, 1987. "Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(1), pages 34-39, Spring.
  46. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "Experience rating and premium risk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 311-314.
  47. Joseph Farrell, 1986. "Moral Hazard as an Entry Barrier," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 440-449, Autumn.
  48. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "A note on inertia in market share," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 73-75.
  49. Farrell, Joseph, 1986. "How effective is potential competition?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 67-70.
  50. Farrell, Joseph & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "Standardization and variety," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 71-74.
  51. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
  52. Farrell, Joseph, 1985. "Owner-consumers and efficiency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 303-306.

Chapters

  1. Joseph Farrell, 2009. "Intellectual Property as a Bargaining Environment," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 39-53 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Klemperer, Paul, 2007. "Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier.

Books

  1. Varian,Hal R. & Farrell,Joseph & Shapiro,Carl, 2004. "The Economics of Information Technology," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521844154, October.
  2. Severin Borenstein & Joseph Farrell, 1998. "Inside the Pin-Factory: Empirical Studies Augmented by Manager Interviews," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number bore98-1, May.

NEP Fields

16 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2001-11-05
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (7) 2003-03-25 2003-03-25 2004-01-12 2004-01-12 2005-04-16 2006-07-28 2006-10-28. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CSE: Economics of Strategic Management (2) 2006-07-28 2006-10-28
  4. NEP-ENT: Entrepreneurship (2) 2001-11-05 2002-01-22
  5. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2005-04-16
  6. NEP-ICT: Information & Communication Technologies (1) 2006-07-28
  7. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2003-03-25 2004-01-12
  8. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2006-10-28
  9. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (2) 2003-03-25 2004-01-12
  10. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2003-03-25 2006-07-28 2006-10-28
  11. NEP-NET: Network Economics (6) 2001-11-05 2002-01-22 2003-03-25 2004-01-25 2006-07-28 2006-10-28. Author is listed
  12. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (2) 2001-11-05 2002-01-22
  13. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2001-11-05
  14. NEP-TID: Technology & Industrial Dynamics (8) 2000-08-15 2001-02-14 2001-11-05 2001-11-05 2002-01-22 2004-01-12 2006-07-28 2006-10-28. Author is listed

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  5. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations
  10. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  19. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  20. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  21. h-index
  22. Number of Registered Citing Authors
  23. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  24. Number of Journal Pages
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  27. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  28. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  29. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  30. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  31. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
  32. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  33. Breadth of citations across fields
  34. Wu-Index
  35. Strength of students

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