Renegotiation-Proofness In Finite And Infinite Stage Games Through The Theory Of Social Situations
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- in its series Papers with number 04-88.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
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Postal: NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.
Phone: 5595 9000
Fax: 5595 9100
Web page: http://www.nhh.no/
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game theory ; social behaviour;
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- Licun Xue, .
"Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games,"
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- Geir B. Asheim, 1995. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers 1128, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Asheim, G.B., 1991. "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers 9169, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Asheim, G.B., 1996. "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum 20/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- David G. Pearce, 1991. "Repeated Games: Cooperation and Rationality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 983, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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