This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Farsighted Stability in Hedonic Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Effrosyni Diamantoudi
Licun Xue () (Department of Economics, University of Aarhus, Denmark)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We investigate how rational individuals partition themselves into different coalitions in "hedonic games" [see Banerjee, Konishi and S”nmez (1998) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2000)], where individuals' preferences depend solely on the composition of the coalition they belong to. We show that the four solution concepts studied in the literature (core, Nash stability, individual stability and contractual individual stability) exhibit myopia on the part of the players. We amend these notions by endowing players with foresight in that they look many steps ahead and consider only credible outcomes. We show the existence and study the properties of the new solutions, as well as their relation to the previous notions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.au.dk/afn/wp/00/wp00_12.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2000-12.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-12

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Hedonic games; coalition structures; foresight;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi & Tayfun Sonmez, 1999. "Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 449, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Licun Xue, 1998. "Coalitional stability under perfect foresight," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 603-627. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Greenberg Joseph & Weber Shlomo, 1993. "Stable Coalition Structures with a Unidimensional Set of Alternatives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 62-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Farrell, Joseph & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 1988. "Partnerships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 279-97, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Greenberg, Joseph, 1994. "Coalition structures," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 37, pages 1305-1337 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Demange, Gabrielle, 1982. "Single-peaked orders on a tree," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 389-396, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, . "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
  2. Alison Watts, 2006. "Formation of Segregated and Integrated Groups," Working Papers 2006.127, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Shao Sung & Dinko Dimitrov, 2007. "On Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 31-45, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Vincent Vannetelbosch & Ana Mauleon & Wouter Vergote, 2008. "Von Neumann-Morgenstern Farsightedly Stable Sets in Two-Sided Matching," Working Papers 2008.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Funaki, Y. & Yamato, T., 2007. "Sequentially Stable Coalition Structures," Discussion Paper 2007-96, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Alison Watts, 2007. "Formation of segregated and integrated groups," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 505-519, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Boriss Siliverstovs, . "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition AutoRegressive model," Economics Working Papers 2000-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Dynamic Farsighted Stability," Discussion Papers 22, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Working Papers 0614, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Dinko Dimitrov & Shao Chin Sung, 2006. "A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games," Working Papers 2006.10, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Gabrielle Demange, 2006. "The strategy structure of some coalition formation games," PSE Working Papers 2006-38, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, . "Investment under Uncertainty - the Case of Repeated Investment Options," Economics Working Papers 2000-15, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc and its associated services are free for contributors and users, and do not accept any advertising.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.