Coalition Formation in General Apex Games
AbstractWe generalize the class of apex game by combining a winning coalition of symmetric minor players with�a collection of apex sets which can form winning coalitions only together with a fixed quota of minor players.� By applying power indices to these games and their subgames we generate players' preferences over coalitions which we use to define a coalition formation game.� We focus on strongly monotonic power indices and investigate under which conditions on the initial general apex game there are core stable coalitions in the resulting coalition formation game.� Besides several general results, we develop condition for the Shapley-Shubik index, the Banzhaf index, and the normalized Banzhaf index in particular.� It turns out that many statements can be easily verified for arbitrary collections of apex sets.� Nevertheless, we give some relations between the collection of apex sets and the set of core stable coalitions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 680.
Date of creation: 28 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Apex Games; Core Stability; Hedonic Games; Strong monotony;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-11-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-11-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2013-11-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-11-16 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-NET-2013-11-16 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Vincent IehlÃ©, 2005.
"The core-partition of hedonic games,"
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Vincent IehlÃ©, 2005. "The core-partition of hedonic games," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1) b05091, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- IehlÃ©, Vincent, 2007. "The Core-Partition of Hedonic Games," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/87, Paris Dauphine University.
- Tayfun SÃ¶nmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001.
"Core in a simple coalition formation game,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer,
Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006.
"A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions,"
386, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Montero, M.P., 1999.
"Noncooperative Bargaining in Apex Games and the Kernel,"
Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research
1999-61, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Montero, Maria, 2002. "Non-cooperative bargaining in apex games and the kernel," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 309-321, November.
- Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980.
"Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society,
Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-64, July.
- Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2006.
"Government versus Opposition: Who Should be Who in the 16th German Bundestag?,"
Journal of Economics, Springer,
Springer, vol. 89(2), pages 115-128, November.
- Dinko Dimitrov & Claus-Jochen Haake, 2005. "Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag?," Working Papers 375, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
- Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2008. "Stable governments and the semistrict core," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 460-475, March.
- Sagonti, Emanuela, 1991. "On the Strong Monotonicity of Power Indices," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 13-22.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Wise).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.