Advanced Search

Papers Articles Authors Institutions Data (FRED®)

Abstract

Ben-Porath (1997) characterizes the strategies consistent with common certainty of rationality (CCR) and the origin of a generic game of perfect information. More generally, the notion of "weak extensive form rationalizability" (weak EFR) captures the implications initial CCR in an extensive form game. We go one step further by ascertaining at which additional information sets initial CCR can be maintained "consistently". Our consistency notion has two aspects: we examine whether there is "internal consistency" in assuming CCR at a given collection of information sets by using Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (1999) recent result while we introduce "external consistency" to account for all reachable information sets. For a class of games, including all belief- consistent games [cf. Reny (1993)], we identify a unique collection of information sets and hence a unique set of strategy profiles; moreover, we show that in this case our notion is outcome-equivalent to Pearce's (1984) EFR. But in general out notion is between weak and Pearce's EFR.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: ftp://ftp.econ.au.dk/afn/wp/00/wp00_4.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus in its series Economics Working Papers with number 2000-4.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Length: 21
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-4

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.au.dk/afn/

Related research

Keywords: Rationality; beliefs; extensive games; rationalizability;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2000-10-05 (All new papers)

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
   
   • Pierpaolo Battigali & Giacomo Bonanno, . "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Department of Economics 98-14, California Davis - Department of Economics.
   • Giacomo Bonanno & Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2003. "Recent Results On Belief, Knowledge And The Epistemic Foundations Of Game Theory," Working Papers 9814, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
2. Leslie McFarland-Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1993. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 1040, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   
   • Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 2000. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 324-329, May.
   • Marx, Leslie M. & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 219-245, February.
   • Leslie M. Marx & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance," Discussion Papers 1066R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
3. D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 514, David K. Levine.
   
   • Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July.
   • D. B. Bernheim, 2010. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000381, David K. Levine.
4. Damme, E.E.C. van, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154422, Tilburg University.
5. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
   
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli, . "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Working Papers 111, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
6. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
   
   • van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
7. Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   
   • Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
   • E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 379, David K. Levine.
8. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589819.
9. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589826.
10. Aumann, Robert J., 1998. "On the Centipede Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 97-105, April.
11. Samuelson, L., 1990. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Working papers 90-14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    
    • Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 1-89-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    • Samuelson, L., 1991. "Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge," Papers 9110, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    • Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 5-89-6, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
12. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April.
13. Kreps,David M. & Wallis,Kenneth F. (ed.), 1997. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521589833.
14. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April.
    
    • P. Reny, 2010. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 386, David K. Levine.
15. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
16. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July.
17. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
18. Gul, Faruk, 1996. "Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-31, July.
19. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
20. Shimoji, Makoto & Watson, Joel, 1998. "Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 161-195, December.

Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as HTML HTML with abstract plain text plain text with abstract BibTeX RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite) ReDIF in new window

Cited by:

1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-2, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
   
   • Effrosyni Diamantoudi, 2003. "Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 431-446, 09.
   • Effrosyni Diamantoudi, . "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers 2001-9, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
2. Bo Sandemann Rasmussen, . "Government Debt and Capital Accumulation in the Blanchard-Cass-Yaari OLG Model," Economics Working Papers 2000-14, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
3. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, . "A Dynamic Agricultural Household Model with Uncertain Income and Irreversible and Indivisible Investments under Credit Constraints," Economics Working Papers 2000-7, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
4. Boriss Siliverstovs, . "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition AutoRegressive model," Economics Working Papers 2000-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
   
   • Boriss Siliverstovs, 2005. "The Bi-parameter Smooth Transition Autoregressive model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(23), pages 1-11.
5. Nikolaj Malchow-Moeller & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, . "Investment under Uncertainty - the Case of Repeated Investment Options," Economics Working Papers 2000-15, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aah:aarhec:2000-4

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

---

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.

Privacy Legal