Why Mergers Reduce Profits And Raise Share Prices-A Theory Of Preemptive Mergers
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- Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2001. "Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive Mergers," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-26, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- FRIDOLFSSON, Sven-Olof & STENNEK, Johan, 1999. "Why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices: A theory of preemptive mergers," Working Papers 1999018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
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