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Mergers and Acquisitions Motives

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  • Jrisy Motis

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    (Toulouse School of Economics - EHESS (GREMAQ) and University of Crete)

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    Abstract

    In this paper I analyze and summarize a broad list of different merger motives that has been proposed in the literature. I propose a categorization of such motives based on the residual claimant of the mergers gains, namely the owners or the managers of the merging firms, and on welfare effects. I also review the different empirical methods that have been proposed to investigate for merger motives, gains and effects.

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    File URL: http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/paper2mottis.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0730.

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    Length: 31 pages
    Date of creation: 15 Feb 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:crt:wpaper:0730

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    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April.
    2. Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2001. "Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive Mergers," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-26, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    3. Bonnet, C. & Dubois, P. & Simioni, M., 2006. "Two-part tariffs versus linear pricing between manufacturers and retailers : empirical tests on differentiated products markets," Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse) 200604, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
    4. Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2001. "Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis," Industrial Organization 0012002, EconWPA, revised 05 Jan 2001.
    5. Ivaldi, Marc & Mccullough, Gerard, 2010. "Welfare Tradeoffs in U.S. Rail Mergers," TSE Working Papers 10-196, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Eckbo, B. Espen, 1983. "Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 241-273, April.
    7. Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2007. "The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 455-489.
    8. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
    9. McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael A., 1988. "Can event studies detect anticompetitive mergers?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 199-203.
    10. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
    11. Mitchell, Mark L. & Mulherin, J. Harold, 1996. "The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 193-229, June.
    12. Mueller, Dennis C, 1969. "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 643-59, November.
    13. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, April.
    14. Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 1998. "Are Mega-Mergers Anticompetitive? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 803-827, Winter.
    15. Evans, William N & Kessides, Ioannis N, 1994. "Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 341-66, May.
    16. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
    17. Klaus Gugler & Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu & Christine Zulehner, 2001. "The Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-21, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    18. Damien Neven, 2002. "Discrepancies Between Markets and Regulators: an Analysis of the First ten Years of EU Merger Control," IHEID Working Papers 10-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    19. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2000. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    20. Gregor Andrade & Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, 2001. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 103-120, Spring.
    21. Gunther Tichy, 2001. "What Do We Know about Success and Failure of Mergers?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 347-394, December.
    22. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
    23. Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn, 2003. "European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 57-85, March.
    24. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    25. Henry G. Manne, 1965. "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 351.
    26. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-26, October.
    27. Philip Crooke & Luke Froeb & Steven Tschantz & Gregory Werden, 1999. "Effects of Assumed Demand Form on Simulated Postmerger Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 205-217, November.
    28. Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G. & Ruback, Richard S., 1992. "Does corporate performance improve after mergers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 135-175, April.
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