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Mergers and Acquisitions Motives Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jrisy Motis () (Toulouse School of Economics - EHESS (GREMAQ) and University of Crete)
In this paper I analyze and summarize a broad list of different merger motives that has been proposed in the literature. I propose a categorization of such motives based on the residual claimant of the mergers gains, namely the owners or the managers of the merging firms, and on welfare effects. I also review the different empirical methods that have been proposed to investigate for merger motives, gains and effects.
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Paper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
0730.
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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 15 Feb 2007Date of revision:
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Keywords: References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael A., 1988.
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Economics Letters ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983.
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Journal of Financial Economics ,
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Gregor Andrade & Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, 2001.
"New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Roll, Richard, 1986.
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Journal of Business ,
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Henry G. Manne, 1965.
"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988.
"Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
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Evans, William N & Kessides, Ioannis N, 1994.
"Living by the "Golden Rule": Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline Industry ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 341-66, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eckbo, B. Espen, 1983.
"Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
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Ajeyo Banerjee & E. Woodrow Eckard, 1998.
"Are Mega-Mergers Anticompetitive? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 803-827, Winter.
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Mueller, Dennis C, 1969.
"A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2007.
"The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data ,"
Journal of Law & Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, pages 455-489.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2002.
"The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 02-34, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Duso, Tomaso & Neven, Damien J & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003.
"The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using Stock Market Data ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Mitchell, Mark L. & Mulherin, J. Harold, 1996.
"The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 193-229, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Healy, Paul M. & Palepu, Krishna G. & Ruback, Richard S., 1992.
"Does corporate performance improve after mergers? ,"
Journal of Financial Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 135-175, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Henry G. Manne, 1965.
"Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 73, pages 110.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Gugler, Klaus & Mueller, Dennis C. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin & Zulehner, Christine, 2003.
"The effects of mergers: an international comparison ,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 625-653, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis ,"
Economics Working Papers
8880, University of California at Berkeley.
Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1989.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis ,"
Papers
e-89-3, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis ,"
Papers
17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2001.
"Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis ,"
Industrial Organization
0012002, EconWPA, revised 05 Jan 2001.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Carl Shapiro & Joseph Farrell, 2000.
"Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis ,"
Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series
CPC00-015, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 2000.
"Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis ,"
Economics Working Papers
E00-291, University of California at Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, 2000.
"Scale Economies and Synergies in Horizontal Merger Analysis ,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
1022, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
[Downloadable!] Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985.
"Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2005.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits And Raise Share Prices-A Theory Of Preemptive Mergers ,"
Journal of the European Economic Association ,
MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1083-1104, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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