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An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions

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  • Bergman, Mats A.

    () (Department of Economics)

  • Jakobsson, Maria

    () (Stockholm University)

  • Razo, Carlos

    () (Stockholm University)

Abstract

Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the EU Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase 2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probability increases also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that post-merger collusion is easy. We do not find significant effects of political variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms or the identity of the commissioner.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:6.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 03 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_006

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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Keywords: competition law; antitrust; merger; merger reulation;

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  1. Röller, Lars-Hendrik & Stennek, Johan & Verboven, Frank, 2000. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," Working Paper Series 543, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  3. Khemani, R S & Shapiro, Daniel M, 1993. "An Empirical Analysis of Canadian Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 161-77, June.
  4. Nilssen, Tore, 1997. "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 89-100, March.
  5. Davies, S.W. & Driffield, N.L. & Clarke, R., 1998. "Monopoly in the UK: What Determines whether the MMC finds against the Investigated Firms?," University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics 9808, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  6. Damien Neven, 2002. "Discrepancies Between Markets and Regulators: an Analysis of the First ten Years of EU Merger Control," IHEID Working Papers 10-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
  7. Stennek, J. & Verboven, F., 2001. "Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness - Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 556, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
  8. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
  9. Daniel McFadden, 1976. "The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 55-72, Spring.
  10. Daniel McFadden, 1975. "The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 401-416, Autumn.
  11. Ghosal, Vivek & Gallo, Joseph, 2001. "The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 27-54, January.
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