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An Econometric Analysis of the European Commission's Merger Decisions

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Author Info
Bergman, Mats A. () (Department of Economics)
Jakobsson, Maria () (Stockholm University)
Razo, Carlos () (Stockholm University)

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Abstract

Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the EU Commission and logit regression techniques, we analyse the Commission's decision process. We find that the probability of a phase 2 investigation and of a prohibition of the merger increases with the parties' market shares. The probability increases also when the Commission finds high entry barriers or that post-merger collusion is easy. We do not find significant effects of political variables, such as the nationality of the merging firms or the identity of the commissioner.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2003:6.

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Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 03 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2003_006

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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
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Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: competition law; antitrust; merger; merger reulation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2000. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Davies, Stephen W & Driffield, Nigel L & Clarke, Roger, 1999. "Monopoly in the UK: What Determines Whether the MMC Finds against the Investigated Firms?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(3), pages 263-83, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Daniel McFadden, 1976. "The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Empirical Evidence," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 55-72, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stennek, J. & Verboven, F., 2001. "Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness - Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 556, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
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  5. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
  6. T. N. Srinivasan, 1997. "Introduction," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(3), pages 205-205, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Daniel McFadden, 1975. "The Revealed Preferences of a Government Bureaucracy: Theory," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 401-416, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. R. H. Parker, Y. Lemarchand, T. Boyns, 1997. "Introduction," Accounting, Business and Financial History, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 251-257, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Khemani, R S & Shapiro, Daniel M, 1993. "An Empirical Analysis of Canadian Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 161-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ghosal, Vivek & Gallo, Joseph, 2001. "The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 27-54, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Damien Neven, 2002. "Discrepancies Between Markets and Regulators: an Analysis of the First ten Years of EU Merger Control," HEI Working Papers 10-2002, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies. [Downloadable!]
  12. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Nilssen, Tore, 1997. "On the Consistency of Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(1), pages 89-100, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marcos Avalos & Rafael E. De Hoyos, 2008. "An Empirical Analysis of Mexican Merger Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 113-130, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Sören, 2004. "Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation," Working Paper Series 2004:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2006. "Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis," Working Papers 06-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Ghosal, Vivek, 2007. "Regime Shift in Antitrust," MPRA Paper 5460, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Elena Cefis & Anna Sabidussi & Hans Schenk, 2007. "Do Mergers of Potentially Dominant Firms foster Innovation? An Empirical Analysis for the Manufacturing Sector," Working Papers 07-20, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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