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The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Tomaso Duso
Damien J. Neven
Lars-Hendrik Röller
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The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of European Union (EU) merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 167 EU mergers between 1990 and 2002 and evaluate their competitive consequences by the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual and optimal decisions as indicated by the stock market in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission’s decisions cannot be solely accounted for as protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as influence is concerned, however, our data suggest that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive to firms’ interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors—such as market definition and procedural aspects, as well as country and industry effects—do play a significant role.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Law and Economics .
Volume (Year): 50 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 455-489
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:50:y:2007:p:455-489Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/
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Paper Tomaso Duso & Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2002.
"The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence using Stock Market Data ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 02-34, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Duso, Tomaso & Neven, Damien J & Röller, Lars-Hendrik, 2003.
"The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using Stock Market Data ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3880, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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"Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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Other versions:
Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 2000.
"Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control ,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
00.24, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
[Downloadable!] Damien J. Neven & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2000.
"Consumer Surplus vs. Welfare Standard in a Political Economy Model of Merger Control ,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 00-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2006.
"EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment ,"
Discussion Papers
81, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Other versions: Joseph Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2008.
"The impact of horizontal mergers on rivals: Gains to being left outside a merger ,"
Discussion Papers
239, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Joseph A. Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2008.
"The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger ,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2008-17r, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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"The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger ,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2008-17r, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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"The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6867, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Joseph A. Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2009.
"The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger ,"
Journal of Management Studies ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Gregory Werden, 2008.
"Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States ,"
De Economist ,
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Elena Carletti & Philipp Hartmann & Steven Ongena, 2007.
"The economic impact of merger control - what is special about banking? ,"
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Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burçin Yurtoglu, 2006.
"How Effective is European Merger Control? ,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2006-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2006.
"How Effective is European Merger Control? ,"
Discussion Papers
153, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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Nihat Aktas & Eric Bodt & Richard Roll, 2004.
"European M&A Regulation is Protectionist ,"
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"Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement ,"
CeNDEF Working Papers
04-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
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Other versions: Barros, Pedro Pita & Clougherty, Joseph A & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007.
"Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2007.
"Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools ,"
CIG Working Papers
SP II 2007-02, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!] Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2007.
"Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools ,"
Discussion Papers
218, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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"An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957–2007 ,"
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"Acquisiton Strategies: Empirical Evidence of Outsider-Toeholds ,"
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Langus, Gregor & Motta, Massimo, 2007.
"The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm’s Valuation ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6176, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2006.
"Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis ,"
Working Papers
06-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008.
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Other versions: Oliver Budzinski & Jürgen-Peter Kretschmer, 2007.
"Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal Mergers: A Re-Interpretation of the Farrell-Shapiro-Framework ,"
Marburg Working Papers on Economics
200714, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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"Antitrust Enforcement and the Design of Disclosure Rules. An Application to Merger Control ,"
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Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
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Damien Neven & Hans Zenger, 2008.
"Ex Post Evaluation of Enforcement: A Principal-Agent Perspective ,"
De Economist ,
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"Regime Shift in Antitrust ,"
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Paolo Buccirossi & Lorenzo Ciari & Tomaso Duso & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Cristiana Vitale, 2008.
"A Short Overview of a Methodology for the Ex-Post Review of Merger Control Decisions ,"
De Economist ,
Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 453-475, December.
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Jan Loecker & Jozef Konings & Patrick Cayseele, 2008.
"Merger Review: How Much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective? ,"
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