This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence Using Stock Market Data

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Duso, Tomaso
Neven, Damien J
Röller, Lars-Hendrik

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The objective of this Paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual decisions and what the stock market would have dictated in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission’s decisions cannot be solely accounted for by the motive of protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as firms’ influence is concerned, however, our data suggests that the commission’s decisions are not sensitive to firms’ interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors – such as country and industry effects, as well as market definition and procedural aspects – do play significant roles.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3880.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3880.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3880

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: mergers political economy

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General
L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Schwert, G. William, 1996. "Markup pricing in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 153-192, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Lars-Hendrik Röller & Johan Stennek & Frank Verboven, 2000. "Efficiency Gains from Mergers," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2000. "Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers," Working Paper Series 542, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Stillman, Robert, 1983. "Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 225-240, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Malcolm B. Coate, 2002. "A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers," Economics and Politics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Khemani, R S & Shapiro, Daniel M, 1993. "An Empirical Analysis of Canadian Merger Policy," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(2), pages 161-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kaplan, Steven N & Weisbach, Michael S, 1992. " The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 107-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Langus, Gregor & Motta, Massimo, 2007. "The Effect of EU Antitrust Investigations and Fines on a Firm’s Valuation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6176, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Patrice Bougette & Stéphane Turolla, 2006. "Merger Remedies at the European Commission: A Multinomial Logit Analysis," Working Papers 06-08, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2008. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2006. "EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment," Discussion Papers 81, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Joseph Clougherty & Tomaso Duso, 2008. "The impact of horizontal mergers on rivals: Gains to being left outside a merger," Discussion Papers 239, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Aldo Gonzalez, 2004. "Antitrust Enforcement and the Design of Disclosure Rules. An Application to Merger Control," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 199, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Elena Carletti & Philipp Hartmann & Steven Ongena, 2007. "The economic impact of merger control - what is special about banking?," Working Paper Series 786, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burçin Yurtoglu, 2006. "How Effective is European Merger Control?," CIG Working Papers SP II 2006-12, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Burcin Yurtoglu, 2006. "How Effective is European Merger Control?," Discussion Papers 153, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Nihat Aktas & Eric Bodt & Richard Roll, 2004. "European M&A Regulation is Protectionist," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management 1252, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ornaghi, Carmine, . "Mergers and Innovation: The Case of the Pharmaceutical Industry," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0605, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
  10. Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2004. "Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement," CeNDEF Working Papers 04-07, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Barros, Pedro Pita & Clougherty, Joseph A & Seldeslachts, Jo, 2007. "Remedy for Now but Prohibit for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," CEPR Discussion Papers 6437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Bruce Lyons, 2008. "An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957–2007," Working Papers 08-17, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ghosal, Vivek, 2007. "Regime Shift in Antitrust," MPRA Paper 5460, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  14. Lindqvist, Tobias, 2005. "Acquisiton Strategies: Empirical Evidence of Outsider-Toeholds," Working Paper Series 634, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create your own reading lists on IDEAS.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.