Personal Details
First Name: Sven-Olof
Middle Name:
Last Name: Fridolfsson
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID: pfr121
Email: [This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Homepage:
Postal Address:
Phone:
Affiliation
(in no particular order)
Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) (Research Institute of Industrial Economics)
Location: Stockholm, Sweden
Homepage: http://www.ifn.se/
Email:
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Postal: Box 55665, S-102 15 Stockholm
Handle: RePEc:edi:iuiiise (registered authors at this institution)
Works
| Working papers | Articles | Access
and download statistics | Citations (if
any)| NEP Fields |
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML
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Working papers
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, 2007.
"A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control,"
Working Paper Series
686, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, 2007.
"Anti- versus Pro-Competitive Mergers,"
Working Paper Series
694, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2006.
"Industry Concentration and Welfare - On the Use of Stock Market Evidence from Horizontal Mergers,"
Working Paper Series
682, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2001.
"Should Mergers Be Controlled?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2705, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2000.
"Should Mergers be Controlled?,"
Working Paper Series
541, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
- Fridolfsson, S.-O. & Stennek, J., 2000.
"Should Mergers be Controlled?,"
Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers
541, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
- Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2001.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive Mergers,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 01-26, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Published as: - Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2000.
"Why Event Studies Do Not Detect Anti-Competitive Mergers,"
Working Paper Series
542, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: - Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 1999.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices,"
Working Paper Series
511, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 03 Dec 2001.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2000.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2357, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Fridolfsson, S.-O. & Stennek, J., 1999.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share Prices,"
Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers
511, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
Articles
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2005.
"Hold-up of anti-competitive mergers,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 753-775, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2005.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits And Raise Share Prices-A Theory Of Preemptive Mergers,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1083-1104, 09.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
NEP Fields
5 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
- NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 1999-03-15
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2007-01-02 2007-01-13 2007-01-13 2007-02-24 Author is listed
- NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (1) 1999-03-22
- NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (4) 2007-01-02 2007-01-13 2007-01-13 2007-02-24 Author is listed
- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 1999-03-22 2007-01-13 2007-02-24 Author is listed
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