Trust and Deterrence
AbstractThis paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears then mainly driven by 'distrust', the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter the most, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9002.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-06-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2012-06-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-06-25 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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