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Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis

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  • Blanco, Mariana

    ()
    (Universidad del Rosario)

  • Engelmann, Dirk

    ()
    (Royal Holloway, University of London)

  • Koch, Alexander K.

    ()
    (Aarhus University)

  • Normann, Hans-Theo

    ()
    (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Abstract

Within-subject data from sequential social dilemma experiments reveal a correlation of first-and second-mover decisions for which two channels may be responsible, that our experiment allows to separate: i) a direct, preference-based channel that influences both first- and second-mover decisions; ii) an indirect channel, where second-mover decisions influence beliefs via a consensus effect, and the first-mover decision is a best response to these beliefs. We find strong evidence for the indirect channel: beliefs about second-mover cooperation are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs. But when first movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves still have predictive power regarding their first moves, suggesting that the direct channel also plays a role.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 4624.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 87, 122–135.
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4624

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Keywords: consensus effect; experimental economics; social dilemmas;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Le Coq, Chloe & Tremewan, James & Wagner, Alexander K., 2013. "Social Centipedes: the Impact of Group Identity on Preferences and Reasoning," SITE Working Paper Series 24, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
  2. Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander, 2011. "Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs," IZA Discussion Papers 5957, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Bruttel, Lisa & Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2012. "No contract or unfair contract: What's better?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 384-390.
  4. Blanco, Mariana & Engelmann, Dirk & Normann, Hans Theo, 2011. "A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 321-338, June.
  5. Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin, 2012. "Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 678-689.
  6. Fabrizio Adriani & Silvia Sonderegger, 2013. "Trust, Trustworthiness and the Consensus Effect: An Evolutionary Approach," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2013-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  7. Francesco Farina & Gianluca Grimalda, 2011. "A cross-country experimental comparison of preferences for redistribution," Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena 0211, Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena.
  8. Marco Casari & Timothy N. Cason, 2012. "Explicit versus Implicit Contracts for Dividing the Benefits of Cooperation," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1270, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  9. Agnes Bäker & Werner Güth & Kerstin Pull & Manfred Stadler, 2014. "Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 225-240, February.
  10. Ozan Aksoy & Jeroen Weesie, 2013. "Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis of Biased Beliefs and Distributional Other-Regarding Preferences," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 66-88, February.
  11. Lucy Ackert & Ann Gillette & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2011. "Are benevolent dictators altruistic in groups? A within-subject design," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 307-321, September.

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