The effects of private damage claims on cartel activity: Experimental evidence
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- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2021. "The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1926, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2019. "The Effect of a Leniency Rule on Cartel Formation and Stability: Experiments with Open Communication," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1835, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
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More about this item
Keywords
Private damage claims; cartel stability; laboratory experiment; leniency;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2019-07-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2019-07-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2019-07-08 (Law and Economics)
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