Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future
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DOI: 10.1007/s11151-023-09913-1
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- Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023. "Corporate leniency programs for antitrust: Past, present, and future," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-045/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
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More about this item
Keywords
Leniency programs; antitrust; competition policy; cartel;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
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