The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.25932/publishup-49169
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 76, pages 1-1.
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "The leniency rule revisited: Experiments on cartel formation with open communication," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2021. "The Leniency Rule Revisited: Experiments on Cartel Formation with Open Communication," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1926, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Yu Awaya & Vijay Krishna, 2016. "On Communication and Collusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(2), pages 285-315, February.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2020.
"Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(1), pages 71-111.
- Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers 2018-6, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, revised 19 Sep 2018.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," NBER Working Papers 25095, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018. "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers 126, Peruvian Economic Association.
- David J. Cooper & Kai-Uwe K?hn, 2014.
"Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 247-278, May.
- Kühn, Kai-Uwe & Cooper, David J., 2009. "Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 7563, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Peter L. Ormosi, 2014. "A Tip Of The Iceberg? The Probability Of Catching Cartels," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(4), pages 549-566, June.
- Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2019. "Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 336-354, April.
- Ben Greiner, 2015. "Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 114-125, July.
- Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007.
"Blowing the Whistle,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
- Apesteguia, José & Dufwenberg, Martin & Selten, Reinhard, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers 9/2003, University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE).
- José Apesteguía & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0303, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra, revised 2003.
- Apesteguia, Jose & Dufwenberg, Martin & Selten, Reinhard, 2003. "Blowing the Whistle," Research Papers in Economics 2003:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Ernst Fehr, 2009.
"On The Economics and Biology of Trust,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 235-266, 04-05.
- Ernst Fehr, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 154, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Ernst Fehr, 2009. "On the economics and biology of trust," IEW - Working Papers 399, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fehr, Ernst, 2008. "On the Economics and Biology of Trust," IZA Discussion Papers 3895, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Russell Cooper & Douglas V. DeJong & Robert Forsythe & Thomas W. Ross, 1992.
"Communication in Coordination Games,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 739-771.
- COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2003.
"Leniency programs and cartel prosecution,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 347-379, March.
- Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, "undated". "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Polo, Michele & Motta, Massimo, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Motta, M. & Polo, M., 1999. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Economics Working Papers eco99/23, European University Institute.
- Dean S. Karlan, 2005.
"Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1688-1699, December.
- Dean Karlan, 2004. "Using experimental economics to measure social capital and predict financial decisions," Artefactual Field Experiments 00074, The Field Experiments Website.
- Karlan, Dean S., 2005. "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions," Center Discussion Papers 28429, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
- Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital and Predict Financial Decisions," Working Papers 182, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Research Program in Development Studies..
- Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "Using Experimental Economics to Measure Social Capital And Predict Financial Decisions," Working Papers 909, Economic Growth Center, Yale University.
- Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015.
"Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 663-689.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Working Paper Series 859, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 11 Dec 2014.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:2, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
- Guillaume R. Fréchette & Sevgi Yuksel, 2017. "Infinitely repeated games in the laboratory: four perspectives on discounting and random termination," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 279-308, June.
- Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, 2014. "The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 191-228, June.
- Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), 2018. "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16873.
- Bodnar, Olivia & Fremerey, Melinda & Normann, Hans-Theo & Schad, Jannika Leonie, 2021. "The effects of private damage claims on cartel activity: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 315, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2021.
- repec:pri:rpdevs:gamespaper.pdf is not listed on IDEAS
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Emons, Winand, 2020.
"The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Winand Emons, 2018. "The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion," Diskussionsschriften dp1816, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Emons, Winand, 2018. "The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion," CEPR Discussion Papers 13262, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Matthias Blonski & Peter Ockenfels & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: Axiomatic Approach and Experimental Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 164-192, August.
- Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David B. Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2017.
"Global Evidence on Economic Preferences,"
NBER Working Papers
23943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Armin Falk & Thomas Dohmen & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_006_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_005_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Becker, Anke & Dohmen, Thomas & Enke, Benjamin & Falk, Armin & Huffman, David & Sunde, Uwe, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 79, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Michael Hesch, 2012. "The Effects Of Ringleader Discrimination On Cartel Stability And Deterrence Experimental Insights," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 3(1(5)), pages 26-42.
- Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, 2015. "When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 417-449.
- Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "What Do We Know about the Effectiveness of Leniency Policies? A Survey of the Empirical and Experimental Evidence," SITE Working Paper Series 28, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014.
"Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 223-225.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 159, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, 2016. "Article 101 Tfeu And Market Integration," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(4), pages 749-779.
- repec:srs:volume:v:3:y:2012:i:1(5):p:26-42 is not listed on IDEAS
- Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2012. "fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(2), pages 368-390, June.
- repec:srs:jarle2:3:v:3:y:2012:i:1:p:26-39 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stefan P. Penczynski, 2019. "Using machine learning for communication classification," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(4), pages 1002-1029, December.
- Erev, Ido & Bornstein, Gary & Wallsten, Thomas S., 1993. "The Negative Effect of Probability Assessments on Decision Quality," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 78-94, June.
- Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018.
"Global Evidence on Economic Preferences,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(4), pages 1645-1692.
- Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David B. Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2017. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," NBER Working Papers 23943, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Armin Falk & Anke Becker & Thomas Dohmen & Benjamin Enke & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_005, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Becker, Anke & Dohmen, Thomas & Enke, Benjamin & Falk, Armin & Huffman, David & Sunde, Uwe, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 79, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
- Armin Falk & Thomas Dohmen & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde, 2018. "Global Evidence on Economic Preferences," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_006, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
- Iris Bohnet & Fiona Greig & Benedikt Herrmann & Richard Zeckhauser, 2008.
"Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 294-310, March.
- Iris Bohnet & Fiona Greig & Benedikt Herrmann & Richard Zeckhauser, 2007. "Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States," Discussion Papers 2007-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- Matthew Gentzkow & Bryan Kelly & Matt Taddy, 2019. "Text as Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 57(3), pages 535-574, September.
- Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2013.
"Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 524-544, November.
- Stephen Davies & Oindrila De, 2012. "Ringleaders in larger numbers, asymmetric cartels," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2012-10, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Joseph E. Harrington, 2008. "Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 215-246, June.
- Feinerer, Ingo & Hornik, Kurt & Meyer, David, 2008. "Text Mining Infrastructure in R," Journal of Statistical Software, Foundation for Open Access Statistics, vol. 25(i05).
- Peter T. Dijkstra & Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2021. "Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 13-36, August.
- Pedro Dal Bó & Guillaume R. Fréchette, 2018. "On the Determinants of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 56(1), pages 60-114, March.
- Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo, 2016. "Article 101 TFEU and market integration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66502, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018.
"Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt,"
Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Marvao, Catarina & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Cartels and Leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," SITE Working Paper Series 39, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 16 Nov 2016.
- repec:srs:journl:volume:v:3:y:2012:i:1(5):p:26-42 is not listed on IDEAS
- Harrington, Joseph E. & Hernan Gonzalez, Roberto & Kujal, Praveen, 2016.
"The relative efficacy of price announcements and express communication for collusion: Experimental findings,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 251-264.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Praveen Kujal, 2013. "The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings," Working Papers 13-30, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2004. "Divide et Impera: Optimal Leniency Programmes," CEPR Discussion Papers 4840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gomez-Martinez, Francisco & Onderstal, Sander & Sonnemans, Joep, 2016.
"Firm-specific information and explicit collusion in experimental oligopolies,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-141.
- Francisco Gomez-Martin & Sander Onderstal & Joep Sonnemans, 2015. "Firm-Specific Information and Explicit Collusion in Experimental Oligopolies," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-054/I, Tinbergen Institute.
- Ibáñez Colomo, Pablo, 2016. "Article 101 TFEU and market integration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 66572, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Croson, Rachel T. A., 2000. "Thinking like a game theorist: factors affecting the frequency of equilibrium play," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 299-314, March.
- repec:oup:jcomle:v:12:y::i:4:p:749-779. is not listed on IDEAS
- Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012.
"Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1759-1772.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," DICE Discussion Papers 65, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Nathan H. Miller, 2009. "Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 750-768, June.
- Brenner, Steffen, 2009. "An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 639-645, November.
- Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2017.
"Pricing Behavior of Cartel Outsiders in Incomplete Cartels,"
VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking
168309, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Odenkirchen, Johannes, 2018. "Pricing behavior in partial cartels," DICE Discussion Papers 299, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Harrington, Joseph E., 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 2(1), pages 1-105, August.
- Yves Breitmoser, 2015.
"Cooperation, but No Reciprocity: Individual Strategies in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(9), pages 2882-2910, September.
- Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," MPRA Paper 41731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2020. "Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment," CEPA Discussion Papers 19, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2008. "Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 607-616, June.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023.
"How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023. "How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 152, pages 1-1.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: a machine learning approach," CEPA Discussion Papers 53, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 10024, CESifo.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2000, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Haucap, Justus & Heldman, Christina & Rau, Holger A., 2024.
"Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 148-169.
- Justus Haucap & Christina Heldman & Holger A. Rau, 2022. "Gender and Cooperation in the Presence of Negative Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 9614, CESifo.
- Jeong Yeol Kim & Charles N. Noussair, 2023. "Leniency Policies and Cartel Success: An Experiment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 187-210, September.
- Ruben Korsten & Andrew Samuel, 2023. "Cartel formation and detection: the role of information costs and disclosure," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 117-153, August.
- Isogai, Shigeki & Shen, Chaohai, 2023. "Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
- Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard & Eve-Angeline Lambert, 2023. "Is Amnesty Plus More Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 211-237, September.
- Peter T. Dijkstra & Jacob Seifert, 2023. "Cartel Leniency and Settlements: A Joint Perspective," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 239-273, September.
- Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ali I. Ozkes, 2023. "Strategic environment effect and communication," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 588-621, July.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023.
"Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 111-122, September.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023. "Corporate leniency programs for antitrust: Past, present, and future," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-045/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Gonçalves, Ricardo & Pinho, Joana & Tabacco, Giovanni A., 2022. "How do antitrust regimes impact on cartel formation and managers’ labor market? An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 643-662.
- Haucap, Justus & Heldman, Christina & Rau, Holger A., 2022. "Gender and collusion," DICE Discussion Papers 380, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Lisa Bruttel & Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Communicating Cartel Intentions," CEPA Discussion Papers 77, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2019. "The Effect of a Leniency Rule on Cartel Formation and Stability: Experiments with Open Communication," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1835, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2021. "How do sanctions work? The choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242372, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2020. "Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion – An experiment," CEPA Discussion Papers 19, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023.
"How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
- Andres, Maximilian & Bruttel, Lisa & Friedrichsen, Jana, 2023. "How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: A machine learning approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 152, pages 1-1.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 10024, CESifo.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion: a machine learning approach," CEPA Discussion Papers 53, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Maximilian Andres & Lisa Bruttel & Jana Friedrichsen, 2022. "How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion: A Machine Learning Approach," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2000, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Bodnar, Olivia & Fremerey, Melinda & Normann, Hans-Theo & Schad, Jannika Leonie, 2021. "The effects of private damage claims on cartel activity: Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 315, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2021.
- Peter T. Dijkstra & Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2021. "Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 13-36, August.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023.
"Corporate Leniency Programs for Antitrust: Past, Present, and Future,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 111-122, September.
- Jeroen Hinloopen & Sander Onderstal & Adriaan Soetevent, 2023. "Corporate leniency programs for antitrust: Past, present, and future," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-045/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2019. "Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 336-354, April.
- Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020.
"Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Carsten J. Crede, 2015. "Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion: Determinants, Consequences, and Prevention," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) 2015-01v2, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Isogai, Shigeki & Shen, Chaohai, 2023. "Multiproduct firm’s reputation and leniency program in multimarket collusion," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
- Maria Bigoni & Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Chloé Le Coq & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015.
"Trust, Leniency, and Deterrence,"
The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(4), pages 663-689.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2011. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Working Paper Series 859, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 11 Dec 2014.
- Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:2, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
- Carsten J. Crede & Liang Lu, 2016. "The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Peter T. Dijkstra & Jonathan Frisch, 2018. "Sanctions and Leniency to Individuals, and its Impact on Cartel Discoveries: Evidence from the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 111-134, March.
- Tebbe, Eva, 2018. "Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2018.
- Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.
- Haucap, Justus & Heldman, Christina & Rau, Holger A., 2024.
"Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 148-169.
- Justus Haucap & Christina Heldman & Holger A. Rau, 2022. "Gender and Cooperation in the Presence of Negative Externalities," CESifo Working Paper Series 9614, CESifo.
- Perrotta Berlin, Maria & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Qin, Bei, 2015.
"Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China,"
SITE Working Paper Series
34, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, revised 25 May 2017.
- Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Berlin, Maria & Qin, Bei, 2018. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," CEPR Discussion Papers 12634, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Maria Perrotta Berlin & Bei Qin & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Leniency, Asymmetric Punishment and Corruption: Evidence from China," CEIS Research Paper 431, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 23 Apr 2018.
- Lisa Bruttel & Maximilian Andres, 2024. "Communicating Cartel Intentions," CEPA Discussion Papers 77, Center for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Nick Feltovich & Yasuyo Hamaguchi, 2018. "The Effect of Whistle‐Blowing Incentives on Collusion: An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(4), pages 1024-1049, April.
- Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2022. "Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 237-257, September.
More about this item
Keywords
cartel; judgment of communication; corporate leniency program; price competition; experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-BEC-2021-03-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2021-03-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EXP-2021-03-01 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-IND-2021-03-01 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2021-03-01 (Law and Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pot:cepadp:24. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marco Winkler (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cepotde.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.