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How Do Cartels Operate?

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Author Info
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr

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Abstract

This paper distills and organizes facts about cartels from about 20 European Commission decisions over 1999-2004. It describes the properties of a collusive outcome, monitoring and punishment methods for enforcing it, the frequency of meetings, the organizational structure of cartels, and what preceded cartel formation.

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Paper provided by The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics in its series Economics Working Paper Archive with number 531.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:jhu:papers:531

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
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  3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2004. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 651-673, Winter.
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  4. Joseph E Harrington & Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2004. "Collusion under Monitoring of Sales," Economics Working Paper Archive 509, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Joseph E. Harrington, 2005. "Optimal Cartel Pricing In The Presence Of An Antitrust Authority," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 145-169, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Orley Ashenfelter & Kathryn Graddy, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's," NBER Working Papers 10795, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Zhongmin Wang, 2008. "Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 35-52, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2008. "Endogenous Cartel Formation with Heterogeneous Firms," Economics Working Paper Archive 544, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sebastian Kranz & Susanne Ohlendorf, 2009. "Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments," Discussion Papers 259, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Pedro Mendi & Róbert F. Veszteg, 2009. "Sustainability of collusion: evidence from the late 19th century basque iron and steel industry," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 33(3), pages 385-405, September. [Downloadable!]
  5. Ganslandt, Mattias & Persson, Lars & Vasconcelos, Helder, 2007. "Asymmetric Collusion and Merger Policy," Working Paper Series 719, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Zhijun, 2008. "Cartel Organization and Antitrust Enforcement," Working Papers 08-21, Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-28.


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