Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence
AbstractSocial norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number wp751.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari & Maria Bigoni, 2010. "Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1236, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-06-04 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-06-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Duffy, John & Ochs, Jack, 2009.
"Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 785-812, July.
- John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000060, David K. Levine.
- John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics.
- John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2006. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Working Papers 274, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2008.
- Kandori, Michihiro, 1992.
"Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1994.
"Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
- Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
- van Damme,Eric, 1986.
"Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated Prisoner`s dilemma,"
Discussion Paper Serie A
84, University of Bonn, Germany.
- van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012.
"Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1759-1772.
- Fonseca, Miguel A. & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2012. "Explicit vs. tacit collusion: The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments," DICE Discussion Papers 65, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- John Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Following Recommendations to Avoid Coordination-Failure in 2 x 2 Games," Discussion Papers 12-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2013. "Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment," Working Papers 2013/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.