Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence
AbstractSocial norms of cooperation are studied under several forms of communication. In an experiment, strangers could make public statements before playing a prisoner’s dilemma. The interaction was repeated indefinitely, which generated multiple equilibria. Communication could be used as a tool to either signal intentions to coordinate on Pareto-superior outcomes, to deceive others, or to credibly commit to actions. Some forms of communication did not promote the incidence of efficient Nash play, and sometimes reduced it. Surprisingly, cooperation suffered when subjects could publicly commit to actions.
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Date of creation: May 2011
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- Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari & Maria Bigoni, 2010. "Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1236, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-06-04 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-06-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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