Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence
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- G. Camera & M. Casari & M. Bigoni, 2011. "Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence," Working Papers wp751, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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More about this item
Keywordscoordination; cheap-talk; deception; indefinitely repeated game; social norms;
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-09-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-09-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-09-03 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-09-03 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-09-03 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-09-03 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-09-03 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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