Communication, commitment, and deception in social dilemmas: experimental evidence
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- Gabriele Camera & Marco Casari & Maria Bigoni, 2010. "Communication, Commitment, and Deception in Social Dilemmas: Experimental Evidence," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1236, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- John Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2012. "Following Recommendations to Avoid Coordination-Failure in 2 x 2 Games," Discussion Papers 12-04, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- John Duffy & Frank Heinemann, 2016.
"Central Bank Reputation, Cheap Talk and Transparency as Substitutes for Commitment: Experimental Evidence,"
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SFB649DP2016-053, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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"Pledges of Commitment and Cooperation in Partnerships,"
MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(1), pages 1-16, January.
- Lachlan Deer & Ralph-C. Bayer, 2015. "Pledges of commitment and cooperation in partnerships," ECON - Working Papers 201, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Dec 2015.
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"Explicit vs. tacit collusion—The impact of communication in oligopoly experiments,"
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- repec:gam:jgames:v:7:y:2016:i:1:p:4:d:62541 is not listed on IDEAS
- Johne Bone & Michalis Drouvelis & Indrajit Ray, 2013. "Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria," Discussion Papers 12-04r, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch’ng Kean, 2014. "Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
- Schütte, Miriam & Thoma, Carmen, 2014. "Promises and Image Concerns," Discussion Papers in Economics 20861, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Aurora García-Gallego & Penélope Hernández-Rojas & Amalia Rodrigo-González, 2013. "Endogenous vs. Exogenous Transmission of Information: An Experiment," Working Papers 2013/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
More about this item
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-06-04 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-06-04 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-06-04 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-06-04 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-06-04 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-06-04 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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