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Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining

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Author Info
Bourjade, Sylvain
Rey, Patrick
Seabright, Paul

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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number 499.

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Date of creation: May 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:7815

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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  1. R. Preston McAfee & Hugo Mialon & Sue Mialon, 2005. "Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive?," Emory Economics 0524, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  2. Gianmaria Martini & Cinzia Rovesti, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion. Public agencies vs delegation," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 70(2), pages 127-151. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Connor, John M. & Bolotova, Yuliya, 2006. "Cartel overcharges: Survey and meta-analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1109-1137, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Hugh C. Briggs III & Kathleen D. Huryn & Mark E. McBride, 1996. "Treble Damages and the Incentive to Sue and Settle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 770-786, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Salant, Stephen W, 1987. "Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1326-36, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 870-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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