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Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of “Natural” Framing

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  • Jana Krajcova
  • Andreas Ortmann

Abstract

We study the effects of loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. We find a strong gender effect: men and women react differently to real-world framing. The treatment effect becomes significant once we allow for genderspecific coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on experimental tests of (anti-)corruption measures and adds evidence to the (mixed) results on gender effects and the on-going discussion on the need for sociodemographic controls.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp372.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cer:papers:wp372

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Keywords: Corruption; anti-corruption mechanisms; optimal contract; monitoring;

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References

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  1. Jacob K Goeree & Charles A Holt, 2004. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000900, David K. Levine.
  2. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption and Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162.
  3. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
  4. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
  5. Anand V. Swamy & Stephen Knack & Young Lee & Omar Azfar, 2000. "Gender and Corruption," Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, Williams College 2000-10, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  6. Dollar, David & Fisman, Raymond & Gatti, Roberta, 2001. "Are women really the "fairer" sex? Corruption and women in government," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(4), pages 423-429, December.
  7. David J Cooper & John B Van Huyck, 2002. "Evidence on the Equivalence of the Stratetic and Extensive Form Representation of Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 234936000000000001, David K. Levine.
  8. Jinyoung Hwang, 2002. "A Note On The Relationship Between Corruption And Government Revenue," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 27(2), pages 161-177, December.
  9. Klaus Abbink & Bernd Irlenbusch & Elke Renner, 2000. "An Experimental Bribery Game," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1389, Econometric Society.
  10. Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloe & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Fines, Leniency, Rewards and Organized Crime: Evidence from Antitrust Experiments," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics 698, Stockholm School of Economics.
  11. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 98/63, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Klaus Abbink & Heike Hennig-Schmidt, 2002. "Neutral versus Loaded Instructions in a Bribery Experiment," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse23_2002, University of Bonn, Germany.
  13. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  14. Ulrich Kamecke, 1997. "note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 409-417.
  15. Vivi Alatas & Lisa Cameron & Ananish Chaudhuri & Nisvan Erkal & Lata Gangadharan, 2006. "Gender and Corruption: Insights from an Experimental Analysis," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 974, The University of Melbourne.
  16. Vito Tanzi, 1998. "Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(4), pages 559-594, December.
  17. Alvin E. Roth, 2002. "The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1341-1378, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Klaus Abbink & Utteeyo Dasgupta & Lata Gangadharan & Tarun Jain, 2013. "Letting the Briber Go Free: An Experiment on Mitigating Harassment Bribes," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series, Monash University, Department of Economics 62-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An Experiment," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 738, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 06 Aug 2009.

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