Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of “Natural” Framing
AbstractWe study the effects of loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. We find a strong gender effect: men and women react differently to real-world framing. The treatment effect becomes significant once we allow for genderspecific coefficients. Our paper contributes to the (small) literature on experimental tests of (anti-)corruption measures and adds evidence to the (mixed) results on gender effects and the on-going discussion on the need for sociodemographic controls.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp372.
Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Corruption; anti-corruption mechanisms; optimal contract; monitoring;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2009-01-10 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2009-01-10 (Law & Economics)
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