Contributions to Cournot oligopoly theory
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 28 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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- Hoernig, Steffen H., 2003. "Existence of equilibrium and comparative statics in differentiated goods Cournot oligopolies," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 989-1019, September.
- Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2001.
"Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share Prices: A Theory of Preemptive Mergers,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 01-26, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Sven-Olof Fridolfsson & Johan Stennek, 2005. "Why Mergers Reduce Profits And Raise Share Prices-A Theory Of Preemptive Mergers," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(5), pages 1083-1104, 09.
- Fridolfsson S.O. & Stennek J., 1999. "Why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices: A theory of preemptive mergers," Working Papers 1999018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Lindqvist, Tobias, 2004. "Mergers by Partial Acquisition," Working Paper Series 630, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- George Norman & Lynne Pepall, 1998. "Horizontal Mergers in Spatially Differentiated NonCooperative Markets: a Comment," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9804, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Lommerud, K.E. & Sorgard, L., 1997.
"Merger and Product Range Rivalery,"
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen
165, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- Tobias Lindqvist & Johan Stennek, 2005. "The Insidersâ€™ Dilemma: An Experiment on Merger Formation," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 267-284, September.
- Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Stennek, Johan, 2005. "Hold-up of anti-competitive mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 753-775, December.
- Yang, Chin W. & Hwang, Ming J. & Sohng, Soong N., 2002. "The Cournot competition in the spatial equilibrium model," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-154, March.
- Song, E. Young, 1996. "Voluntary export restraints and strategic technology transfers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 165-186, February.
- George Norman & Lynne Pepall, 1998. "Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition: Urban Sprawl and Product Specialization," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 9813, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1995. "Horizontal mergers of price-setting firms with sunk capacity costs," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 245-256.
- Ramon Villanova & Jaume Paradís & Pelegrí Viader & Joan Miralles, 2002. "Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets," Economics Working Papers 646, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2012.
- Corchon, Luis C. & Fradera, Isabel, 2002. "Comparative statics in Cournot free entry equilibrium," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 155-168, November.
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