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The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

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Author Info
Roman Inderst
Christian Wey

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Abstract

We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements.

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Paper provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its series Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin with number 423.

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Length: 24 p.
Date of creation: 2004
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Publication status: Published in: International Journal of Industrial Organization 22 (2004). 8-9, 1067-1089
Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp423

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Keywords: Takeover bidding; Merger incentives; Oligopoly;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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  6. Fridolfsson S.O. & Stennek J., 1999. "Why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices: A theory of preemptive mergers," Working Papers 1999018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Cheung, Francis K., 1992. "Two remarks on the equilibrium analysis of horizontal merger," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 119-123, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Nilssen, Tore & Sorgard, Lars, 1998. "Sequential horizontal mergers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(9), pages 1683-1702, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Hackner, Jonas, 2000. "A Note on Price and Quantity Competition in Differentiated Oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 233-239, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Brito, Duarte, 2003. "Preemptive mergers under spatial competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1601-1622, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Horn, Henrik & Persson, Lars, 2001. "Endogenous mergers in concentrated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(8), pages 1213-1244, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Randall Morck & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1988. "Characteristics of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, pages 101-136 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
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  19. Perry, Martin K & Porter, Robert H, 1985. "Oligopoly and the Incentive for Horizontal Merger," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 219-27, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Vives, Xavier, 1985. "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 166-175, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Steven N. Kaplan & Mark L. Mitchell & Karen H. Wruck, 1997. "A Clinical Exploration of Value Creation and Destruction in Acquisitions: Organizational Design, Incentives, and Internal Capital Markets," NBER Working Papers 5999, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1990. "The Limits of Monopolization through Acquisition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 465-99, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Qiu, Larry D., 1997. "On the Dynamic Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 213-229, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Albert Banal-Estañol & Paul Heidhues & Rainer Nitsche & Jo Seldeslacht, 2006. "Merger Clusters during Economic Booms," City University Economics Discussion Papers 06/07, Department of Economics, City University, London. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Christos Cabolis & Constantine Manasakis & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2008. "Horizontal Mergers and Acquisitions with Endogenous Efficiency Gains," Working Papers 0817, University of Crete, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rosato, Antonio, 2008. "“Matching Auctions” for Hostile Takeovers: A Model with Endogenous Target," MPRA Paper 15083, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 07 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
  4. Albert Banal-Estanol & Paul Heidhues & Rainer Nitsche & Jo Seldeslachts, 2009. "Screening and Merger Activity," Discussion Papers 270, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Felix Höffler, 2008. "On the consistent use of linear demand systems if not all varieties are available," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4(14), pages 1-5. [Downloadable!]
  6. Molnar, Jozsef, 2007. "Pre-emptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence," Research Discussion Papers 17/2007, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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