Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Philippe Jehiel
  • Benny Moldovanu

Abstract

We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, specific phenomena with allocative externalities: even in complete information settings, traditional auction formats need not be efficient, and they may give rise to multiple equilibria and strategic non-participation. But, in the absence of informational externalities, welfare maximization can be achieved by Vickrey-Clarke- Groves mechanisms. Welfare-maximizing Bayes-Nash implementation is, however, impossible in multi-object settings with informational externalities, unless the allocation problem is separable across objects (e.g. there are no allocative externalities nor complementarities) or signals are one-dimensional. Moreover, implementation of any choice function via ex-post equilibrium is generically impossible with informational externalities and multidimensional types. A theory of information constraints with multidimensional signals is rather complex, but indispensable for our study.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.enpc.fr/ceras/jehiel/londonjm.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 784828000000000490.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 04 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000490

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Aviad Heifetz & Zvika Neeman, 2006. "On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(1), pages 213-233, 01.
  2. Kittsteiner, Thomas, 2003. "Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 54-76, July.
  3. Sorana, Valter, 2000. "Auctions for Universal Service Subsidies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 33-58, July.
  4. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  5. Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 427-454, June.
  6. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
  7. ehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1994. "How (not) to sell nuclear weapons," Discussion Paper Serie B 288, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  9. Ledyard, John O., 1978. "Incentive compatibility and incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 171-189, June.
  10. Claudio Mezzetti, 2004. "Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1617-1626, 09.
  11. Gomes, Armando R & Jehiel, Philippe, 2001. "Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3012, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. RICHARD McLEAN & ANDREW POSTLEWAITE, 2004. "Informational Size and Efficient Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71, pages 809-827, 07.
  13. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "License Auctions and Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 371-396, 06.
  14. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2001. "Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1237-59, September.
  16. Hansen, Robert G, 1985. "Auctions with Contingent Payments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 862-65, September.
  17. Robert B. Wilson, 1967. "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 13(11), pages 816-820, July.
  18. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  19. Fieseler, Karsten & Kittsteiner, Thomas & Moldovanu, Benny, 2003. "Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 223-234, December.
  20. Hongwei Gui & Rudolf M¨uller & Rakesh V. Vohra, 2004. "Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1392, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  21. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Ex Post Implementation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001110, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
  23. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
  24. Sudipto Dasgupta & Kevin Tsui, 2004. "Auctions with cross-shareholdings," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 163-194, 07.
  25. Anton, James J. & Vander Weide, James H. & Vettas, Nikolaos, 2002. "Entry auctions and strategic behavior under cross-market price constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 611-629, May.
  26. Johnson, Scott & Pratt, John W & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1990. "Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 873-900, July.
  27. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo & S. Viswanathan, 2004. "Merger Mechanisms," Department of Economics Working Papers, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics 04-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
  28. Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu & William R. Zame, 2005. "The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 839, UCLA Department of Economics.
  29. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2002. "On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(1), pages 343-355, January.
  30. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  31. Thomas G. McGuire & Michael H. Riordan, 1991. "Incomplete Information and Optimal Market Structure: Public Purchases from Private Providers," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0010, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  32. Robert, Jacques, 1991. "Continuity in auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 169-179, October.
  33. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
  34. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Vaimaki, 2000. "Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1248, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  35. Dirk Alboth & Anat Lerner & Jonathan Shalev, 1997. "Profit Maximizing in Auctions of Public Goods," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9707010, EconWPA, revised 01 Apr 1998.
  36. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & GERARD-VARET, Louis-André, . "Incentives and incomplete information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -354, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  37. Keith Waehrer, 2004. "Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 465-477, 04.
  38. Krishna, K., 1990. "Auctions with Endogenous Valuations: The Persistence of Monopoly Revisited," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 472, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  39. Keith Waehrer, 2003. "Hazardous Facility Siting When Cost Information Is Private: An Application of Multidimensional Mechanism Design," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(4), pages 605-622, October.
  40. Jacob K. Goeree & Emiel Maasland & Sander Onderstal & John L. Turner, 2005. "How (Not) to Raise Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 897-926, August.
  41. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring.
  42. Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information," Microeconomics, EconWPA 0211012, EconWPA.
  43. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  44. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Moldovanu, Benny, 2000. "An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 00-10, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  45. Katharine E. Rockett, 1990. "Choosing the Competition and Patent Licensing," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 161-171, Spring.
  46. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," NBER Working Papers 12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  47. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  48. Klemperer, Paul, 1999. " Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 227-86, July.
  49. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 567-89, August.
  50. Isabelle Brocas, 2003. "Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 125-149, March.
  51. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design For Multiple Objects with Externalities," 2005 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 866, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  52. Maeda, Akira, 2003. "The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 293-314, November.
  53. Norback, Pehr-Johan & Persson, Lars, 2004. "Privatization and foreign competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 409-416, March.
  54. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1995. "Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1196, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  55. Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "Mixed bundling auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 494-512, May.
  56. Laffont & Martimort, 1997. "Collusion under asymmetric information," Working Papers 152574, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  57. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "Regulation by Duopoly," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 20, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  58. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1979. "Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1137-44, September.
  59. Sushil Bikhchandani, 2004. "The Limits of Ex Post Implementation Revisited," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000514, UCLA Department of Economics.
  60. Ausubel Lawrence M & Milgrom Paul R, 2002. "Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-44, August.
  61. Bagwell,K. & Mavroidis,P.C. & Staiger,R.W., 2003. "The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  62. Zvika Neeman, 1998. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 0093, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  63. Hain, Roland & Mitra, Manipushpak, 2004. "Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 271-291, August.
  64. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June.
  65. Das Varma, Gopal, 2003. "Bidding for a process innovation under alternative modes of competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 15-37, January.
  66. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1985. "Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist When Demands Are Interdependent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 345-61, March.
  67. Wolfgang Pesendorfer & Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1996. "Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1168, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  68. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-83, March.
  69. Dasgupta, Partha S & Hammond, Peter J & Maskin, Eric S, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216, April.
  70. Gresik, Thomas A., 1991. "Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 41-63, October.
  71. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 2002. "An Efficient Auction," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1199-1212, May.
  72. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August.
  73. Armstrong, Mark, 1996. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 64(1), pages 51-75, January.
  74. Goeree, Jacob K., 2003. "Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 345-364, February.
  75. Engelbrecht-Wiggans Richard, 1994. "Auctions with Price-Proportional Benefits to Bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 339-346, May.
  76. Gopal Das Varma, 2002. "Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(4), pages 689-708, Winter.
  77. Jeffrey C. Ely & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002. "Ex-Post Incentive Compatible Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1339, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  78. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-19, July.
  79. Bernard Caillaud & Philippe Jehiel, 1998. "Collusion in Auctions with Externalities," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 680-702, Winter.
  80. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
  81. John L. Turner & Emanuel Ornelas, 2004. "Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 286, Econometric Society.
  82. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  83. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
  84. Gruner, Hans Peter & Kiel, Alexandra, 2004. "Collective decisions with interdependent valuations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1147-1168, October.
  85. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508.
  86. David P�rez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2002. "Choosing Wisely: A Multibidding Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1577-1587, December.
  87. Morgan John & Steiglitz Ken & Reis George, 2003. "The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 2(1), pages 1-27, April.
  88. Wilson, Robert, 1979. "Auctions of Shares," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 675-89, November.
  89. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny, 1997. "Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 97-06, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  90. Eric Maskin, 2001. "Auctions and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science 0002, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  91. Cremer, Jacques & McLean, Richard P, 1988. "Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1247-57, November.
  92. Jehiel, Phillipe & Moldovanu, Benny & Stacchetti, E., 1997. "Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 97-04, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  93. Thomas Kittsteiner & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 51(2), pages 236-248, February.
  94. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November.
  95. Indranil Chakraborty, 1999. "Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 723-733.
  96. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Inefficiencies in Bargaining: Departing from Akerlof and Myerson-Satterthwaite," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000744, UCLA Department of Economics.
  97. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2004. "The Design of an Efficient Private Industry," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 2(2-3), pages 516-525, 04/05.
  98. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2003. "An economic perspective on auctions," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 18(36), pages 269-308, 04.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Axel Ockenfels, 2008. "Marktdesign und Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung," Working Paper Series in Economics, University of Cologne, Department of Economics 41, University of Cologne, Department of Economics.
  3. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  4. Maarten C.W. Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2007. "Do Auctions select Efficient Firms?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-001/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  5. Gärtner, Dennis L. & Schmutzler, Armin, 2009. "Merger negotiations and ex-post regret," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1636-1664, July.
  6. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir A. Karamychev & Emiel Maasland, 2009. "Auctions with Flexible Entry Fees," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-109/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  7. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A. & Maasland, Emiel, 2011. "Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 594-601, June.
  8. Csapó Gergely & Müller Rudolf, 2012. "Optimal mechanism design for the private supply of a public good," Research Memorandum 038, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  9. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2013. "Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1862-1890.
  10. Carbajal, Juan Carlos & McLennan, Andrew & Tourky, Rabee, 2013. "Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1074-1101.
  11. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A., 2009. "Auctions, aftermarket competition, and risk attitudes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 274-285, March.
  12. Börgers, Tilman & Cox, Ingemar & Pesendorfer, Martin & Petricek, Vaclav, 2008. "Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence," MPRA Paper 29125, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  14. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:784828000000000490. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.