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Mixed Bundling Auctions

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  • Jehiel, Philippe
  • Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz
  • Moldovanu, Benny

Abstract

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5566.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5566

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Keywords: auction; mixed bundling; revenue maximization;

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References

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  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
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  16. Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "Dominant strategy implementation of Bayesian incentive compatible allocation rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 378-399, April.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Miravete, Eugenio J., 2011. "Convolution and composition of totally positive random variables in economics," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 479-490.
  2. Sergiu Hart & Noam Nisan, 2012. "Approximate Revenue Maximization with Multiple Items," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000433, David K. Levine.
  3. Pagnozzi, Marco, 2009. "Resale and bundling in auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 667-678, November.
  4. Gerrit Frackenpohl & Gert Pönitzsch, 2013. "Bundling Public with Private Goods," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse05_2013, University of Bonn, Germany.
  5. Chakraborty, Indranil, 2006. "Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 31-46, January.
  6. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Chakraborty, Indranil & Shyamalkumar, Nariankadu D., 2014. "Revenue and efficiency ranking in large multi-unit and bundle auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 12-21.
  8. Bo Chen, 2013. "Assignment Games with Externalities And Matching-Based Competition," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse08_2013, University of Bonn, Germany.

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