Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.
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Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
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Jehiel, Philippe & Meyer-Ter-Vehn, Moritz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006.
"Mixed Bundling Auctions,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5566, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions:
Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006.
"Mixed Bundling Auctions,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001123, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Philippe Jehiel & Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn & Benny Moldovanu, 2006.
"Mixed Bundling Auctions,"
Discussion Papers
141, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!]