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A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions

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Author Info

  • Philippe Jehiel

    ()
    (ERAS and UCL)

  • Benny Moldovanu

    ()
    (University of Mannheim)

Abstract

Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2001/Volume3/EB-01C70004A.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 1-5

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Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-01c70004

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Keywords: efficiency;

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References

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  1. Page Jr., Frank H., 1998. "Existence of optimal auctions in general environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 389-418, May.
  2. Paul Milgrom, . "Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction," Working Papers 98002, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
  3. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-83, March.
  4. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 1998. "The Optimality of Being Efficient," Papers of Peter Cramton 98wpoe, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 18 Jun 1999.
  5. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 1988. "Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 15-19.
  6. Armstrong, Mark, 2000. "Optimal Multi-object Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 455-81, July.
  7. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Rapisarda, G., 2004. "A note on low-price menu auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 343-346, June.
  2. Brusco, Sandro & Lopomo, Giuseppe, 2002. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 407-36, April.
  3. Michal Bresky, 2009. "Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-Unit Uniform-Price Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp384, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta & Nicolas Figueroa, 2008. "The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design," Working Papers 08-12, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Jackson, Matthew O. & Kremer, Ilan, 2004. "The relationship between the allocation of goods and a seller's revenue," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 371-392, June.

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