Mechanisms for dividing labor and sharing revenue in joint ventures
AbstractOrganizing the productive efforts of firms participating in a joint venture involves assigning firms to tasks according to abilities. A multidimensional incentive problem arises when abilities are private information. In any equilibrium, it is better to be a firm who is a specialist rather than a generalist. However, generalists can expect to receive a larger allocation of revenue. If at least one firm is decisive to the profitability of the joint venture (i.e., if it can make a credible cost announcement that implies the joint venture earns zero profit), then the joint venture will not be able to implement a profit maximizing or cost minimizing production plan. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review Economic Design.
Volume (Year): 8 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (04)
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- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006.
"Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001129, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000490, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2005. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 142, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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