Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Bidding for the future: signaling in auctions with an aftermarket

Contents:

Author Info

  • Goeree, Jacob K.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-48712NR-2/2/c6cf31a69060ffc5e19b7b3ce9a4b32c
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 108 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 345-364

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:108:y:2003:i:2:p:345-364

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Kamien, Morton I & Tauman, Yair, 1986. "Fees versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-91, August.
  4. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  5. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Kamien, Morton I., 1992. "Patent licensing," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354 Elsevier.
  7. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  8. ehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu & Ennio Stacchetti, 1994. "How (not) to sell nuclear weapons," Discussion Paper Serie B 288, University of Bonn, Germany.
  9. Mailath, George J, 1989. "Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 417-27, May.
  10. Cameron Charles M. & Rosendorff B. Peter, 1993. "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 44-70, January.
  11. Avery, Christopher, 1998. "Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(2), pages 185-210, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2006. "Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms," CEPR Discussion Papers 5558, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Information Transmission In Elimination Contests," Working Papers 0511, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  3. Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2010. "Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire," Discussion Paper Series 1010, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  4. Giebe, Thomas & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2007. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners and) Losers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 199, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  5. Andrew F. Daughety, 2006. "Cournot Competition," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0620, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  6. Masili, Gustavo, 2006. "Auction with aftermarket for budget constrained bidders," MPRA Paper 2134, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2009. "Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 291, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  8. Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Chatterjee, Rittwik, 2013. "Selling a Cost Reducing Production Technique through Auction in a Duopolistic Industry," MPRA Paper 52010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Oct 2013.
  9. Ding, Wei & Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Horizontal mergers with synergies: Cash vs. profit-share auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 382-391.
  10. Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Nicolas Melissas, 2008. "Bidding and Drilling on Offshore Wildcat Tracts," Working Papers 0805, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  12. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2010. "Signaling in Dynamic Contests: Some Impossibility Results," Working Papers 2072/151621, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  13. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2005. "Signaling In A Dynamic Contest With Boundedly Rational Players," Working Papers 0510, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  14. Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
  15. Scarpatetti, Benedikt von & Wasser, Cédric, 2010. "Signaling in Auctions among Competitors," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 293, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  16. Jun Zhang, 2008. "Simultaneous Signaling in Elimination Contests," Working Papers 1184, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  17. Aniruddha Bagchi, 2008. "Selling licences for a process innovation: the impact of the product market on the selling mechanism," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 1015-1045, August.
  18. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Fan, Cuihong & Jun, Byoung Heon & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2013. "Licensing process innovations when losersʼ messages determine royalty rates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 388-402.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:108:y:2003:i:2:p:345-364. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.