Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2005.00216.x
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- Nisvan Erkal, 2004. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 894, The University of Melbourne.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
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