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Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model

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Author Info
Wang, X. Henry
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-3T88G1F-8/2/8db37766a251de701990e2cc88c21989
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 60 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 55-62
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:60:y:1998:i:1:p:55-62

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  1. Sandro Gleave & Eberhard Feess, 2006. "Patent Licensing and Price Discrimination," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(10), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  2. Marie Thursby & Jerry Thursby & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2005. "Shirking, Sharing Risk, and Shelving: The Role of University License Contracts," NBER Working Papers 11128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. LemariƩ, S., 2005. "Vertical integration and the licensing of innovation with a fixed fee or a royalty," Working Papers 200517, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL). [Downloadable!]
  4. Arijit Mukherjee, 2007. "Optimal licensing contract in an open economy," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(3), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  5. Elisabetta Ottoz & Franco Cugno, 2004. "The independent invention defence in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(5), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  6. Nina Czernich, 2008. "Downstream market structure and the incentive for innovation in telecommunication infrastructure," Ifo Working Paper Series Ifo Working Paper No. 64, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas Giebe & Elmar Wolfstetter, 2006. "License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for Losers," Discussion Papers 96, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2008. "Abuse of Dominance and Licensing of Intellectual Property," MPRA Paper 9454, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Nisvan Erkal, 2004. "Optimal Licensing Policy in Differentiated Industries," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 894, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Eiji Horiuchi & Jota Ishikawa, 2007. "Tariffs and Technology Transfer through an Intermediate Product," Discussion Papers 2007-15, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
  11. Che, Xiaogang & Yang, Yibai, 2009. "Patent Protection with Licensing," MPRA Paper 19438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  12. Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, 2001. "Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 240-259, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Marco Alderighi, 2008. "On the Optimality of Patent Licensing with Maximum Production Volume," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(5), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  14. Ming-Chung Chang, 2009. "Insider patent holder licensing in an oligopoly market with different cost structures: Fixed-fee, royalty, and auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 30(1), pages 20-31. [Downloadable!]
  15. Elisabetta Ottoz, 2005. "Technological spillover and the time distribution of licenses," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 15(15), pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
  16. X. Henry Wang & Judy Hsu, 2004. "On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation," Working Papers 0416, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 23 Dec 2004. [Downloadable!]
  17. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2002. "On Patent Licensing in Spatial Competition," Departmental Working Papers wp0212, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Vargas Barrenechea, Martin, 2008. "Licensing Probabilistic Patents and Liability Rules: The Duopoly Case," MPRA Paper 9925, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. X. Henry Wang & Bill Yang, 2004. "On Technology Transfer to an Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(14), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
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